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Although much research on corporate dividend policy exists, the evidence is far from 
conclusive. Understanding how dividend taxes affect firm-level decisions is crucial to evaluating 
dividend imputation credits which provide shareholder-level tax credits for dividends received or 
decreased shareholder-level dividend tax rates, which reduce the double taxation of dividends. 
Using changes in New Zealand and Australia’s tax regimes, this dissertation provides new 
evidence on the relationship between tax incentives for R&D investment and dividend payment. 
The results show that the theory that the tension between R&D investment and dividend payment 
decreases when a country previously not offering tax incentives for R&D investment or dividend 
payout, implements one, does not hold using New Zealand firms. Further, New Zealand dividend-
paying firms with higher marginal tax rates behave in the manner predicted for firms moving 
from a tax regime offering a tax incentive for R&D investment to a tax regime offering tax 
incentives for both R&D investment and dividend payment. The results using Australian data, 
demonstrate that that the tension between R&D investment and dividend payment increases when 
a country previously offering only a tax incentives for R&D investment, offers one for both R&D 
investment and dividend payment. This result is driven by firms with high marginal tax rates. 
These findings demonstrate that the relationship between tax incentives for R&D investment and 
dividend payment varies according to firm marginal tax rates and typical dividend payment 
policies. It also reiterates the importance of considering firms’ abilities to use R&D tax 
incentives, via their marginal tax rates, when contemplating the effects a shareholder-level 
dividend tax decrease will have on R&D investment. This dissertation also provides new insight 
into the corporate dividend policy views. The results support the double taxation and tax 
irrelevance views in dividend-paying firms operating in a tax regime with dividend imputation 
and capital gains taxes. By documenting a significant decrease in R&D investment after a change 
in dividend taxes, this dissertation also highlights a void in the current corporate dividend policy 
views and shows the need for the inclusion of R&D investment. 
 
vii 
Chapter I 
Introduction 
The role shareholder-level taxes play in corporations’ decisions to pay dividends is still 
debated in academic research. Since Black (1976) posed the questions of why corporations pay 
dividends given their tax disadvantages and why investors appear to pay attention to them, 
researchers have tried to explain corporations’ dividend policies (McKenzie and Thompson 1997, 
Miller and Scholes 1978). Poterba and Summers (1985, 1) reiterate Black’s ideas and they 
demonstrate that when governments tax corporate profits at the corporate level and again when 
they are distributed to shareholders as dividends, corporations should not pay dividends. 
Shareholders should prefer that corporations retain earnings where they can continue to be 
invested by the corporation and increase the corporation’s value (Poterba and Summers 1985). 
Since paying dividends is common among U.S. corporations, corporate dividend policy is 
obviously not this straightforward (Poterba 1987, John and Williams 1985, Poterba and Summers 
1985).1 
Though much research on corporate dividend policy exists, the evidence is far from 
conclusive (Blouin et al. 2004, Fama and French 1998, Zodrow 1991, Easterbrook 1984). 
Understanding how dividend taxes affect firm-level decisions is crucial to evaluating dividend 
imputation credits (McKenzie and Thompson 1997, 465) which provide shareholder-level tax 
credits for dividends received or decreased shareholder-level dividend tax rates, which reduce the 
double taxation of dividends. Three perspectives on how shareholder-level taxes affect firms’ 
dividend-paying decisions dominate the literature: the tax irrelevance view, the tax capitalization 
(or residual) view, and the double taxation view (McKenzie and Thompson 1997, Zodrow 1991, 
Poterba 1987, Poterba and Summers 1985). These three views differ as to why corporations pay 
                                                 
1 The number of firms paying dividends has actually decreased by over 50 percent during the last two 
decades while the number of listed firms has increased (Fama and French 2001, 11).  
dividends, how dividend taxes at the shareholder-level affect dividend payment, and what 
changes in shareholder-level dividend tax policy mean for corporate investment.2  
The tax irrelevance view states that shareholder-level taxes are irrelevant in the 
corporation’s decision to pay dividends because marginal investors do not demand greater pre-tax 
returns from dividend-paying corporations (Miller and Scholes 1978, Miller and Modigliani 
1961). That is, shareholders do not expect the corporation to bear the economic burden of the 
shareholder-level dividend tax by requiring a greater pre-tax return such that they receive a 
minimum desired after-tax return. According to this view, a change in shareholder-level dividend 
taxes would not alter corporate distribution decisions (Poterba and Summers 1985, 13).  
The tax capitalization view, also known as the residual view, states that the market value 
of a corporation’s assets incorporates the present value of expected dividends net of their taxes 
(Auerbach 1979, King 1977). Thus, future taxes on expected dividends are capitalized into price, 
reducing share prices. This view assumes corporations use retained earnings to finance marginal 
corporate investments.3 Corporations only pay dividends when they have cash remaining after 
satisfying all other obligations and making all corporate investment decisions. Further, they pay 
dividends when an alternative tax-advantaged method of distributing the income (sometimes 
referred to as “trapped equity”) does not exist (Zodrow 1991, Auerbach 1979, King 1977). 
According to this view, a decrease in shareholder-level dividend taxes increases the stock price 
but does not alter corporate investment decisions or dividend payments (Poterba and Summers 
1985, 17, McKenzie and Thompson 1997, 464).  
The third view, the double taxation perspective, contends that despite dividends’ tax 
disadvantage, the market rewards corporations for paying dividends by increasing corporate value 
(stock price). Proponents of this view do not claim to know the reason for the reward, but simply 
                                                 
2 Each dividend tax policy view is reviewed in detail in Chapter 2, Section 2. 
3 Throughout this paper, the term “corporate investment” includes both plant, property, and equipment and 
R&D investment. “Capital investment” refers only to plant, property, and equipment; it does not include 
R&D investment.  
2 
accept that the market rewards corporations for paying dividends (Poterba and Summers 1985, 
McClure 1977). According to this view, a decrease in the taxation of dividends reduces a 
corporation’s cost of equity capital because it reduces the corporation’s cost of receiving the 
market’s reward for paying dividends—an increase in stock price. This reduction in the corporate 
cost of equity capital increases the dividend payment. 
The tax irrelevance and tax capitalization views hold that dividend taxes do not impact 
corporate dividend policy and thus, do not directly affect dividend payments. The tax irrelevance 
view predicts that pre-tax dividend payments will not change after implementing a dividend 
imputation credit. Thus, a decrease in dividend taxes will not increase the shareholder’s pre-tax 
dividend income. The tax capitalization view predicts that any change in the pre-tax dividend 
payment will result from a change in the corporation’s profitable alternatives to dividend 
payments, not changes to the shareholder-level dividend tax rate.  
Only the double taxation view predicts that dividend payments will increase as a direct 
result of a decrease in shareholder-level dividend tax rates. Since shareholders will not have to 
pay as much tax on the dividends they receive, the corporation’s marginal cost of paying 
dividends (and, thus, increasing its stock price) declines further, reducing the cost of equity 
capital. In summary, decreasing the taxation of dividends lowers the corporation’s cost of capital, 
increasing capital investment and rates of return, which increases dividend payment (Zodrow 
1991, 503, Poterba and Summers 1985, 21). 
Blouin et al. (2004) find evidence that immediately following The Job and Growth Tax 
Relief Act of 2003 (henceforth 2003 Act), which reduced the tax shareholders pay on dividend 
income, the payment of dividends increased.4 Using the quarters surrounding the enactment of the 
2003 Act, Blouin et al. (2004) document a significant increase in dividends. However, they do not 
                                                 
4 Prior to 2003, dividends that individuals received were taxed at ordinary income tax rates as high as 38.6 
percent. Beginning in 2003, dividends that individuals receive from domestic corporations and qualified 
foreign corporations are taxed at only five percent if the individuals are in the two lowest tax brackets and 
15 percent otherwise (Grace 2003). 
 
3 
find support for their hypothesis that the portion of a firm’s shareholders consisting of individuals 
(i.e., shareholders that the 2003 Act directly affected) influenced the dividend payment. Without 
this support and given overall economic improvements occurring during their study, they are 
“hesitant to conclude that tax rates cut caused dividends to increase” (Blouin et al. 2004, 4). The 
report from the Treasury’s Office of Economic Policy also shows that 134 previously non-
dividend-paying companies paid dividends in 2003 after President Bush signed the new 
legislation (Treasury Office of Economic Policy 2003).  
Blouin et al. (2004) also document a decrease in the number of share repurchases after 
the 2003 Act. While their model does not control for uses of funds other than dividends and share 
repurchases, prior research documents that a decrease in shareholder-level dividend taxes 
increases capital investment. The decrease in shareholder-level dividend taxes lowers firms’ 
average cost of capital by encouraging equity versus debt financing. This reduction in the cost of 
capital leads to an increase in capital investment (Dhaliwal et al. 2003, Black et al. 2000, 
Cummins et al. 1994, Auerbach and Hassett 1991, Jorgenson 1963). However, according to 
Partington’s funds-flow identity (1985), sources of funds must equal uses of funds. In other 
words, managers can only allocate resources that are actually available. Assuming resources are 
fixed, this implies that following a shareholder-level dividend tax decrease, the increases in the 
capital investment and dividend payment would have to be funded by either the decrease in the 
average cost of capital or the decrease in share repurchases. Otherwise current and prior years’ 
earnings and funds previously allocated to R&D investments would be needed to help offset 
increases in capital investment and dividend payment.  
Though inconclusive, two prior studies suggest that shareholder-level dividend tax credits 
also lead to decreases in R&D investment (Thomas et al. 2003, Black et al. 2000). The idea that 
investment in R&D may decrease as a result of shareholder-level dividend tax credits is 
concerning since evidence has shown that domestic R&D spending is linked to both the rate of 
innovation and the ability to learn from others (Cameron, 1996; Salter and Martin, 2001). Black 
4 
et al. (2000) investigate the effect the implementation of dividend imputation credits in Australia 
and New Zealand had on capital investment, hypothesizing an increase in capital investment after 
dividend imputation.5 They initially define their dependent variable, capital investment, as the 
change in the sum of plant, property, and equipment and annual R&D expenditures and then as 
the change in each separate component.6 Their independent variable for dividend payment is the 
dividend payout ratio which represents the ratio of cash dividends to net earnings, controlling for 
variations in dividend payments due to corporate earnings.  
When Black et al. (2000) use Australian data and run an ordinary least squares regression 
with the dependent variable defined as just annual R&D expense, their initial significant positive 
result between the change in the sum of plant, property, and equipment and annual R&D 
expenditures and the existence of a dividend imputation credit becomes significantly negative. 
This significant negative relationship suggests that, after Australia implemented the dividend 
imputation credit in 1988, R&D investment declined despite the fact that Australia also offered an 
incentive for R&D investment. Interestingly, the relationship between R&D expenditures and the 
dividend payout ratio before and after the existence of dividend imputation credits is 
insignificant. Further the entire model becomes insignificant when they run the regression using 
New Zealand data. Due to insignificant relationships between capital investment (defined as 
plant, property, and equipment and R&D investment) and the dividend payout ratio throughout 
the tax change, Black et al. (2000) concluded that dividend imputation credits did not affect 
dividend payout ratios. This finding conflicts with the Blouin et al. (2004) U.S. study which 
concluded that reduced shareholder-level dividend tax rates increase dividend payments (Blouin 
et al. 2004). 
                                                 
5 Again, dividend imputation credits decrease the double taxation of dividends by providing shareholders 
dividend tax credits for taxes the corporation pays. 
6 Their use of “capital investment” differs from this paper, which defines corporate investment as both 
plant, property, and equipment and R&D investment and capital investment as only plant, property, and 
equipment. 
5 
Since Black et al. (2000) focus on changes in capital investment (rather than the 
relationship between R&D investment and dividend payment), they run an OLS regression with 
capital investment as the dependent variable and the dividend payout ratio as an independent 
variable. Prior research suggests that R&D investment and dividend payment are determined in 
conjunction with each other (Partington 1985). When a dependent variable (corporate investment) 
is decided in conjunction with an independent variable (dividend payment), simultaneous 
equations should be used to correct for the correlation between the independent variable and the 
error term (Wooldridge 2002, Johnston and DiNardo 1997). Thus, the OLS regression Black et al. 
(2000) used would not correct for the correlation between the dividend payout ratio and the error 
term, and simultaneous equations should be used to assess the relationship between R&D expense 
and dividend payment. 
Thomas et al. (2003) use simultaneous equations to analyze the relationship between 
R&D expense and dividend payment. They investigate three different tax regimes which vary in 
the tax incentives they provide for paying dividends and investment in R&D.7 The first regime, 
consisting of the United Kingdom and Germany, provides incentives for paying dividends but not 
investing in R&D. In the second and third regimes, France and Canada provide incentives for 
paying dividends and investing in R&D, and the United States and Japan provide incentives for 
investing in R&D but not paying dividends. Thomas et al. (2003) find that the negative 
relationship between R&D expense and dividend payment is stronger, indicating greater tension, 
in tax regimes providing incentives for both R&D investment and dividend payments than in tax 
regimes permitting only one of the incentives. One way to interpret this result is that firms 
operating in countries offering incentives for both R&D investments and dividend payment have 
more difficulty allocating funds to one over the other, creating a stronger negative relationship 
between the two. 
                                                 
7 In these tax regimes, Thomas et al. (2003) do not classify countries with only a 100 percent R&D 
deduction as offering incentives for investment in R&D. This is consistent with the R&D literature. 
 
6 
However, contrary to Berger (1993), Brown (1985) and Eisner and Sullivan (1984), 
Thomas et al. (2003) do not find their theorized positive relationship between R&D incentives 
and R&D investment. If R&D incentives motivate R&D investment, the R&D incentive should 
be positively related to the amount invested in R&D. They argue that their “cross-country 
research design incorporating dividends as well as investment finds that the relation is more 
complex than previously understood in countries whose firms are responding to both R&D credits 
and imputation credits” (p. 49). The lack of support could indicate a problem in the model they 
tested. Prior research has indicated that different countries’ R&D tax incentives vary in the 
amount of credit they provide to corporations within their regime and that it is important to 
consider a firm’s ability to use R&D tax incentives (Billings et al. 1994, Berger 1993, Eisner and 
Sullivan 1984).8 Thomas et al. (2003) do not control for the magnitude of the R&D incentive nor 
the firm’s current tax position. 
Using simultaneous equations and controlling for both the amount of R&D tax incentive 
offered in two similar countries and the ability of corporations to use the R&D tax incentive, this 
paper performs an event study to investigate the role R&D tax incentives and dividend imputation 
credits play in the dividend tax puzzle. Analyzing tax changes within two different but similar 
countries, Australia and New Zealand, this study controls for the benefit the R&D tax incentive 
provides the firm by including marginal tax rates. The marginal tax rate (henceforth MTR) is the 
rate that would be used to calculate the additional tax liability resulting from one additional dollar 
of income. Unlike many event studies in tax research, the tax changes in Australia and New 
Zealand included few significant tax reforms, allowing for a relatively clean experimental design. 
In July of 1985 Australia implemented an R&D investment tax incentive, creating a setting in 
which to investigate the effect of moving from a tax regime offering neither tax incentives for 
R&D investment nor dividend payment to offering only a tax incentive for R&D investment. 
                                                 
8 For example, investment tax credits or foreign tax credits may lower the tax liability such that it is too 
small to fully use the R&D credit (Billings et al. 1994, 21). 
7 
During the late 1980s, both Australia and New Zealand began offering dividend imputation 
credits. Since at the time of dividend imputation, the two countries treat R&D investment 
differently, comparing their responses to the dividend tax changes provides new evidence on (1) 
the relationship between R&D investment incentives and dividend payment incentives and (2) 
dividend tax policy views. 
I find that when moving from a tax regime offering tax incentives for neither R&D 
investment nor dividend payout to one offering a tax incentive for R&D investment, firms do not 
exhibit the weaker inverse relationship between R&D expense and dividend payment predicted in 
Thomas et al. (2003).9 Further, firms do not exhibit their predicted decrease in the negative 
relationship between R&D expense and dividend payment when moving from a tax regime 
offering tax incentives for neither R&D investment nor dividend payout to one offering a tax 
incentive for dividend payment. Contrary to Thomas et al.’s (2003) prediction, I find that 
dividend-paying firms with higher MTRs actually experience an increase in the negativity of the 
relationship between R&D investment and dividend payout when they move from a tax regime 
offering tax incentives for neither R&D investment nor dividend payout, to one offering a tax 
incentive for dividend payment. This relationship between R&D expenses and dividend payment 
does not change in firms with lower MTRs, after dividend imputation.  
This finding has three implications for the literature. First, it demonstrates the importance 
of factoring a firm’s tax status into models investigating tax changes. Second, it demonstrates the 
importance of factoring a firm’s typical dividend payment policy into these models. Third, it 
highlights a potential oversight in much of the literature evaluating the effectiveness of R&D tax 
incentives—the potential for 100 percent deductibility of R&D to act as an incentive for R&D 
investment. I find that when dividend imputation is implemented, dividend-paying firms with 
higher MTRs, receiving only 100 percent deductibility for R&D investment, react in a manner 
                                                 
9 The terminology “weaker inverse relationship” means a decrease in the inverse or negative relationship. 
8 
similar to firms operating under a tax regime offering an additional tax incentive for R&D 
investment.  
I also confirm Thomas et al.’s (2003) finding that the relationship between R&D 
expenses and dividend payout is stronger (more negative) in dividend-paying firms operating in a 
tax regime offering a tax incentive for both R&D investment and dividend payment than in a tax 
regime offering a tax incentive for only R&D investment. I demonstrate this by documenting an 
increase in the negativity of the relationship between R&D investment and dividend payment as 
firms actually move from a tax regime offering only an R&D incentive to one offering a tax 
incentive for both R&D investment and dividend payment. Further, I demonstrate that this 
finding is driven by firms with higher MTRs.  
This improved understanding of the relationship between R&D expense, dividend 
payment, and firm MTRs provides policymakers with more insight as to how different firms 
operating within a country will react to changes in the tax incentives for R&D investment and 
dividend payments. Further, the documented decrease in R&D investment following the 
implementation of dividend imputation in a tax regime not offering an R&D tax incentive 
reiterates the potential for changes in shareholder-level dividend taxes to alter other uses of 
corporate funds. 
The three views of corporate dividend policy, the tax irrelevance view, the tax 
capitalization view and the double taxation view, are not necessarily mutually exclusive. They 
could each hold true for certain corporations under certain conditions (Poterba and Summers 
1985, 2). My research design allows me to (1) separate firms that, before the tax change, typically 
paid dividends from those which did not and (2) separate firms in a tax position to use an R&D 
incentive from those not in such a position. I then analyze each group’s reaction to the dividend 
imputation credit to determine which corporate dividend policy view they follow.  
I find that for dividend-paying firms operating under a tax regime which offers dividend 
imputation but taxes capital gains, the double taxation and tax irrelevant views of corporate 
9 
dividend policy are most descriptive. I also find significant decreases in R&D investment when a 
tax regime not offering tax incentives for dividend payment or R&D investment implements a tax 
incentive for dividend payments. Current dividend policy views do not include R&D investment 
in their predictions and researchers tend to add it to capital investment to determine a firm’s 
overall investment. This paper documents a negative relationship between the two and 
demonstrates the importance of looking at R&D investment separate from capital investment. 
This paper proceeds by further explaining the settings in New Zealand and Australia 
which provide the data used to address the research questions. Chapter II also reviews each of the 
three corporate dividend policy views. Chapter III provides a literature review of the three 
corporate dividend policy views, demonstrating that the evidence is inconclusive. Since the paper 
also investigates the relationship between shareholder-level dividend taxes and R&D corporate-
level taxes, Chapter III includes a review of reactions to changes in R&D corporate-level taxes 
and research indicating a relationship among dividends, investment, and their respective taxes. 
Chapter IV provides the theory behind the model used in the empirical analysis. Chapter V 
develops the hypotheses, and Chapter VI discusses the data and presents the model. Chapter VII 
presents the results of the empirical analysis, and Chapter VIII discusses the implications of the 
paper and its findings. 
10 
Chapter II 
Country Settings and Corporate Dividend Policy Views 
Country Settings 
Effective July of 1985, Australia permitted companies to deduct 150 percent of their 
R&D cost if the total annual R&D expenditure was greater that 20,000 Australian dollars, and 
they registered with the Industry Research and Development Board. This board strictly monitored 
R&D eligibility (Parliament of Australia: Senate Committee Report on Business Taxation 
Reform, chapter 7, paragraph 1). As shown in Table 1, Panel A, prior to July of 1985, firms were 
permitted to deduct 100 percent of R&D.10 In July of 1987, Australia implemented a dividend 
imputation credit in the form of a dividend tax credit.11 The dividend tax credit enabled 
shareholders to receive a credit known as a “franking credit” for the portion of dividends paid out 
of a company’s after-tax profit or “franked dividends” (Petty et al. 2000, 30).12 Thus, 
shareholders calculated their imputed credit on fully-franked dividends as follows:  
Imputation Credit =  
Dividends *  Company tax rate
1 -  Company tax rate
 
Shareholders report the amount of the “franked dividend” they receive plus the imputation credit 
in their gross incomes (where the addition of the imputation credit “grosses up” the dividend 
received to a before-tax amount). They then claim the imputation credit against their tax liability 
(Petty et al. 2000, 31). For example, in 1988 when the maximum corporate and individual tax 
rates were both 48 percent, without dividend imputation, an Australian individual receiving a 
dividend of $100 from an Australian corporation in the 48 percent tax bracket would have 
reported $100 in gross income and been liable for $48.00 in taxes. However, with dividend 
imputation, the individual reported not only the $100 in gross income but also the $92.31 
                                                 
10 Australia operates on a July-June tax year instead of a calendar year. 
11 Again, dividend imputation credits reduce the double taxation of dividends by providing shareholder-
level tax credits for dividends received or decreased shareholder-level dividend tax rates. 
12 Australia refers to its imputation credit as a franking credit. To be consistent with the terminology in the 
literature, this paper continues to refer to it as an imputation credit. 
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imputation credit, calculated according to the above equation. The resulting $192.31 total 
increase in gross income, increased the individual shareholder’s tax before credits by $92.31 (i.e. 
$192.31 times 48 percent individual tax rate). This $92.31 tax liability is fully offset when the 
$92.31 imputation credit is applied against it. Thus, the individual effectively received the $100 
dividend from the corporation free of additional tax. 
As summarized in Panel B of Table 1, Australia also added an individual-level capital 
gains tax in July 1987. Prior to this date, individuals only paid tax on the gain from selling shares 
if they held the shares less than 12 months. Since July 1987, when individuals hold shares over 
one year, they pay tax on the difference between the sale price and the shares’ cost, indexed for 
inflation. They then include this gain in gross income where it is taxed at regular rates. However, 
shareholders no longer pay tax on fully-franked dividends they receive while holding the stock 
(Thomas and Sellers 1994, 87).  
Prior to April of 1988, New Zealand taxed individual residents’ worldwide taxable 
incomes, including dividends, at a three-rate scale of 15, 30, and 48 percent (Cameron 1996). In 
April of 1988, the three-rate scale on individual residents’ worldwide incomes was reduced to a 
two-rate scale of 24 and 34 percent.13 As Panel C of Table 1 shows, corporate rates also fell from 
48 to 33 percent (Brash, 1996). At this time, New Zealand also implemented a dividend 
imputation credit (Prevost et al. 2002, 1100).  
Similar to Australia’s dividend imputation credit, New Zealand residents include 
dividends received plus the corporate tax on these dividends (i.e. gross-up amount) in gross 
income. They then offset their individual tax liabilities with the tax the corporation has already 
paid, i.e. imputation credit (Prevost et al. 2002, 1081). Prior to 1988, New Zealand permitted 
corporations a 100 percent deduction for R&D expenditures. While the tax changes in 1988 did 
                                                 
13 New Zealand operates on an April-March tax year instead of a calendar year. 
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not alter the R&D deduction, the 15 percent reduction in the maximum corporate tax rate reduced 
the value of deducting R&D expenditures (Brash, 1996).14 
The settings in Australia and New Zealand provide unique opportunities in which to test 
the relationship between R&D investment and dividend payment. Australia went from a tax 
regime without tax incentives for R&D investment or dividend payment to a tax regime with a tax 
incentive only for R&D investment and then to a tax regime with tax incentives for both R&D 
investment and dividend payment. New Zealand went from a tax regime without tax incentives 
for R&D investment or dividend payment to a tax regime offering a tax incentive for dividend 
payments.15  
Corporate Dividend Policy Views 
 The three views explaining why corporations pay dividends, the tax irrelevance view, the 
tax capitalization view and the double taxation view, differ in the calculation of the corporation’s 
cost of capital and the components included in this calculation. This difference leads to varying 
predictions in the event of a change in shareholder-level dividend taxes. This section reviews 
each corporate dividend policy view’s calculation of corporate cost of capital and prediction of 
alterations in behavior following a change in shareholder-level dividend taxes. 
Tax Irrelevance View 
In the tax irrelevance view investors do not demand that corporations pay greater returns 
on equity instruments when shareholder-level dividend tax rates or capital gains tax rates 
decrease. Instead investors with similar tax characteristics form tax clienteles. For example, 
individuals or institutions with low shareholder-level dividend tax rates (or MTRs) hold stocks 
with high dividend payments. Likewise investors facing high shareholder-level dividend tax rates 
                                                 
14 For example consider a firm with an income of $20,000 before their R&D expense of $1,000. Prior to the 
tax change the firm would save $480 ($1,000 * .48) in taxes via the R&D deduction; after the tax change 
the same amount of R&D expense, $1,000, would only save the firm $330 ($1,000 * .33) in taxes.  
15 New Zealand did continue its 100 percent deduction of R&D. However, Thomas et al. (2003) did not 
classify countries with only a 100 percent R&D deduction as ones offering incentives for investment in 
R&D. For comparability, I use the same classification approach. 
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will hold stocks with low dividend payments. Due to uncertainty, investors also hold some stock 
inconsistent with their tax-preferred dividend payment for diversification. Thus, a “marginal 
investor clientele” forms which is indifferent between receiving dividends or capital gains.16 
Further, as clarified below, the effective shareholder-level dividend tax rate and capital gains tax 
rate of these marginal investors is zero (Poterba and Summers 1985, Miller and Scholes 1978, 
Miller and Modigliani 1961). 
Miller and Scholes (1978), proponents of this view, argue that all personal taxes can be 
effectively laundered. For example, a marginal investor who is selling stock at a loss will also sell 
stock with a gain, bringing his effective capital gains rate to zero. Further, a marginal investor 
consisting of a pension fund, university, or charity pays no tax and, thus, has a zero tax rate on 
both shareholder-level dividends and capital gains. Since the effective shareholder-level dividend 
and capital gains tax rates for the marginal investor are zero, the return to the marginal investor 
for one dollar initially invested is the return on the investment after corporate-level taxes. Neither 
the shareholder-level dividend tax rate nor the capital gains tax rate factor into the corporation’s 
cost of equity capital. Since a permanent change in shareholder-level dividend taxes or capital 
gains taxes will not result in a change in the corporate cost of equity, corporate investments and 
dividend payment policies will not change.  
Tax Capitalization View 
The tax capitalization view states that shareholder-level dividend taxes are an additional 
tax on corporations’ profits, and thus shareholders capitalize future dividend taxes into share 
values (Auerbach 1979, King 1977). Corporations only pay dividends when they have cash 
remaining after paying all other obligations and it is the only method for them to distribute this 
trapped equity. Since an alternative tax-advantaged method of distributing the income does not 
exist, corporations finance dividends with this remaining or residual cash. In other words, 
                                                 
16 The marginal investor is the investor who determines the market price of the securities under 
consideration. Under the tax irrelevance view this is the investor whose marginal tax rates on dividends and 
capital gains are virtually equal (Poterba and Summers 1985, 11). 
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dividends do not signal the market; they merely return trapped equity to stockholders (McKenzie 
and Thompson 1997, Zodrow 1991, Poterba and Summers 1985). 
 These firms continue to use retained earnings for corporate investment until investors are 
indifferent between reinvesting within the firm and receiving additional dividends. Not paying 
dividends defers the tax on the corporation’s earnings from the original investment and causes 
stock price appreciation. This tax deferral offsets the later shareholder-level dividend tax (Zodrow 
1991, 500, Poterba and Summers 1985, 15). In other words, the after-tax appreciation of the stock 
equals the after-tax value of foregone dividends. For instance, if a corporation uses one dollar for 
new investment, instead of paying one dollar in dividends, the shareholder does not have to pay 
the shareholder-level dividend tax and thus saves an amount equal to the shareholder-level 
dividend tax rate. However, the reinvested one dollar will increase the stock price causing the 
shareholder to pay a capital gains tax.17 In equilibrium, the cost to the shareholder of the 
corporation investing one dollar instead of paying one dollar in dividends equals the value of the 
new investment, qN, which is reflected in the stock price as follows: 
)q)(RateTax  Gains (CapitalRate)Tax  Dividend Level-rShareholde1(q NN +−=  (1)
where (1- Shareholder-Level Dividend Tax Rate) is the after-tax dividend the shareholder would 
have received if the corporation had paid dividends and (Capital Gains Tax Rate)( qN) is the 
capital gains tax the shareholder pays as a result of the increase in stock price the new corporate 
investment causes. Rewriting equation (1) in terms of the value of the corporate-level investment 
of one dollar in equilibrium results in the following:  
                           
RateTax  Gains Capital1
RateTax  Dividend Level-rShareholde1N
−
−=q  (2) 
 
                                                 
17 For the sake of simplicity, this discussion assumes that capital gains taxes are paid annually as they 
accrue. This is similar to Australia’s capital gains taxes. 
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Whether the corporation pays a dollar of dividends or uses it for corporate investment, the value 
to the shareholder of each initial dollar invested in the company is the same, and thus dividend tax 
policy plays a role in the value of the corporation but does not influence corporate investment. 
To demonstrate this, consider two scenarios, one in which the corporation pays dividends 
and one in which it foregoes paying dividends for corporate investment. In both cases the 
individual initially owns 50 shares of stock, each valued at $1.40, giving him a total stock value 
of $70. The shareholder-level dividend tax rate is 46 percent, and the capital gains tax rate is 10 
percent.   
Scenario A: The corporation pays a cash dividend of $1 per share.  
Since the dividend is paid and not used for corporate reinvestment, the value of the stock does not 
change. The individual pays $23 in shareholder-level dividend taxes [($1 dividend per share) (50 
shares) (0.46 dividend tax rate)], receives $27 after shareholder-level dividend taxes [($1 
dividend per share) (50 shares) – $23 shareholder-level dividend tax], and holds a total of $70 
worth of stock.  
Scenario B: Instead of paying the $100 dividend, the corporation uses it for new investment. 
In accordance with equation (2), the corporate investment will cause the stock price to increase by 
$0.60 per share [($1 foregone dividend) (1 – 0.46 shareholder-level dividend tax rate) / (1 –  0.10 
capital gains tax rate)]. The individual will pay a capital gains tax of $3 [($0.60 share price 
increase) (50 shares) (0.10 capital gains tax rate)]. The individual now owns 50 shares worth $2 
each ($1.40 original stock price + $0.60 increase in stock price), for a total stock value of $100. 
Now, suppose, the individual decides to sell stock equal to his overall stock value increase of $30 
[($0.60 increase in stock price)(50 shares)]. Since his shares each have a value of $2, he sells 15 
shares. This leaves him with $70 worth of stock [($2 per share) (50 initial shares – 15 sold 
shares)]. The total value of the stock, $70 is now the same as it was in Scenario A when the 
corporation paid a $1 dividend instead of investing it. Further, the total amount the shareholder 
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has received is $27 [($30 from stock sale) – ($3 capital gains tax)], the same amount received in 
Scenario A.  
To summarize the total distribution the individual in Scenario A receives is $27 ($1 
dividend * 50 shares - $1 * 50 shares * 0.46 shareholder-level dividend tax rate) which equals the 
total distribution the individual in Scenario B receives after selling the portion of stock equal to 
the capital gain:  
$27 Tax Gains Capital $3 - shares 50
)RateTax  Gains Capital  1.01(
Rate)Tax  Dividend Level-r  Shareholde  0.46(1 * =−
− 


 
Now suppose that instead of selling the 15 shares in Scenario B, the individual continues to hold 
all 50 shares and the corporation pays as dividends all after-corporate-level tax returns from the 
new capital investment. The individual will receive the return on the investment, less corporate 
tax and shareholder-level dividends taxes. The individual will be content with this after-tax return 
as long as it is greater than or equal to the initial cost of each dollar of investment, qN , as defined 
in equations (1) and (2). Each period the individual’s after-tax return will be determined by the 
rate of return of the new corporate investment, the corporate tax rate and the shareholder-level 
dividend tax rate. Again, the individual will expect this after-tax return to equal the initial cost of 
the investment, qN, leading to the following equation: 
Rate)Tax  Dividend Level-rShareholde -1(*Rate)Tax  Corporate(1 *Return of RateTax -Before
                                        
RateTax  Gains Capital-1
RateTax  Dividend Level-rShareholde1q                                  N
−
=−= (3)
As you can see, the shareholder-level dividend taxes in equation (3) cancel out, demonstrating 
that the level of corporate investment is influenced only by corporate tax rates and capital gains 
tax rates. Rewriting equation (3) reveals that the value to the individual of the return per initial 
dollar invested is as follows:       
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     Rate)Tax  Gains Captial Rate)(1Tax  Corporate Return)(1 of RateTax -Before(q        N −−= (4)
Thus, while a permanent change in shareholder-level dividend tax rates will increase the price of 
the stock, unless coupled with a change in capital gains tax rates, it will not result in a change in 
corporate investments or dividend payment policies (Poterba and Summers 1985). 
Double Taxation View  
Similar to tax capitalization view, the double taxation view contends that shareholder-
level dividend taxes are an additional tax on corporate profits. The shareholder’s after-tax return 
is calculated in equation (5): 
Shareholder-Level After Tax Return = [(Before Tax Rate of Return) (1 - Corporate Tax 
Rate)] *  
[(Dividend Payment Rate) (1 – Shareholder-Level Dividend Tax 
Rate) +  
(1 – Dividend Payment Rate)(Capital Gains Rate)] 
(5)
 The twist is that the double taxation view holds that despite their tax disadvantage, 
shareholders reward corporations when they pay dividends by increasing the stock price. Note 
that this differs from the tax capitalization view that stock prices rise when corporations reinvest 
instead of paying dividends. Proponents of the double taxation view do not claim to know the 
reason for the increase in stock price but simply accept that the market rewards corporations 
when they pay dividends (Poterba and Summers 1985, McClure 1977). Therefore, as shown 
below in equation (6), the shareholder’s required rate of return (corporations’ cost of capital) 
depends on corporate taxes and the weighted average of shareholder-level dividend and capital 
gains taxes: 
Shareholder-Level After Tax Return = [(Before Tax Rate of Return) (1 - Corporate Tax 
Rate)] *  
                                    [(w)(Dividend Payment Rate) (1 – Shareholder-Level Dividend Tax 
(6)
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Rate)     
                                    + (1 – w) (1 – Dividend Payment Rate)(Capital Gains Rate)]   
Where (w) is the weight shareholders place on dividend taxes, which depends on the dividend 
payout ratio. When dividend payout ratios are high, shareholders place less weight on 
shareholder-level dividend taxes (w) and more weight on capital gain taxes (1- w). This reduces 
the weighted average tax rate of dividends and capital gains and the shareholder’s required rate of 
return. This lower weighted average tax rate of dividends and capital gains entices firms to pay 
dividends despite their tax disadvantages (Zodrow 1991, Poterba and Summers 1985). A decrease 
in shareholder-level dividend taxes decreases the amount corporations have to pay for the 
shareholder’s after-tax dividend to remain constant. In other words the decrease in shareholder-
level dividend taxes reduces the cost of paying dividends and receiving the increase in stock 
price. This motivates the corporation to increase the dividend payout ratio, decreasing the 
weighted average tax rate of dividends and capital gains and increasing investment (Zodrow 
1991, Poterba and Summers 1985). 
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Chapter III 
Prior Research 
 This literature review first discusses prior research on the three corporate dividend policy 
views. Evidence both supporting and refuting each view exists. I also include research explaining 
potential changes in shareholder-level dividend taxes and a review of the reactions each corporate 
dividend policy view predicts. Since this paper also investigates the relationship between 
shareholder-level dividend taxes and R&D corporate-level taxes, I include a review of potential 
changes in R&D corporate-level taxes and documented reactions to such changes. Lastly, I 
review the research suggesting a relationship among dividends, investment, and their respective 
taxes. 
Corporate Dividend Policy Views 
The first of the three views corporate dividend policy views is the tax irrelevance view. 
Under this view, a corporation’s decision to invest is independent of its decision to pay dividends 
(Miller and Modigliani 1961). Thus, changing the way a country taxes dividends would not 
change the firms’ dividend payments, capital investments, or stock prices (Poterba and Summers 
1985). Miller and Scholes (1978) warn that many studies rely on short-term responses to 
dividends when testing the relationship between taxes and dividend yield or the relationship 
between taxes and rate of return. As a result, findings that do not support the tax irrelevance view 
often are suspect. They demonstrate that dividend announcement effects, which also increase 
rates of return in the short run, bias these studies by creating short-term price increases.  
The tax irrelevance view assumes operation in perfect capital markets; everyone in the 
market has the same expectations of future earnings and amount of risk involved. In other words, 
everyone participating in the market has the same information set (Mougoue and Mukherjee 
1994). But, researchers have found evidence that managers have superior information regarding 
their corporations. Since information asymmetry exists, dividends provide a signal to the market 
(Bhattacharya 1979 and Ross 1977). Ross (1977) uses Spence’s signaling model (1974) to 
20 
investigate the risk investors assume and corporate debt-equity choices. Bhattacharya (1979) 
expands Ross’ model (1977) by including the tax-based cost of paying dividends. He finds that in 
an imperfect market, cash dividends provide a signal of expected firm cash flows.  
Woolridge and Ghosh (1988, 1991) find that corporations do not like to reduce dividend 
payments. Thus, they will only pay dividends when they feel confident that they can continue to 
do so. When they announce a dividend, they signal the market that they are not only in a financial 
position to pay dividends but will continue to pay dividends of the same magnitude in the future. 
John and Williams (1985) develop a model where only dividends are taxed. They demonstrate 
that shareholders’ needs to receive cash, drive the payment of dividends. In their opinion, this 
explains why firms either pay dividends instead of repurchasing shares or pay dividends while 
simultaneously selling new shares.  
The tax irrelevance view also assumes transaction costs and taxes do not exist (Mougoue 
and Mukherjee 1994). However, Easterbrook (1984) contends that not only do taxation costs exist 
but agency costs also influence dividend payments. Managers are imperfect agents of investors, 
and paying dividends helps to restrict their discretion. Easterbrook builds on Jensen and 
Meckling’s theory (1976) that agency costs exist as a result of debt and outside equity. 
Continuously paying dividends encourages managers to raise new money. Further, even if paying 
dividends does not force managers to raise new money, dividends increase the debt-equity ratio. 
Paying dividends versus increasing retained earnings decreases bondholder’s wealth by lowering 
the security the bond provides. This explains why dividends please shareholders (Easterbrook 
1984). 
The second corporate dividend policy view, the tax capitalization view states that despite 
the fact that shareholder-level dividend taxes are an additional tax on corporations’ profits, 
shareholders capitalize future dividend taxes into share values. Thus dividend taxes do not impact 
marginal corporate investment decisions (Auerbach 1979, King 1977, Zodrow 1991). The after-
tax appreciation of the stock equals the after-tax value of foregone dividends. Thus, a permanent 
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change in dividend taxation, unless coupled with a change in capital gains taxation, will not result 
in a change in corporate investments or dividend policies (Poterba and Summers 1985, 15, 
Zodrow 1991, 500).  
Looking at the financing choices of corporations, Masulis (1980) finds that stock prices 
increase when corporations exchange debt for equity and decrease when corporations exchange 
equity for debt. In his opinion, this supports the tax capitalization view: when debt replaces 
equity, stock prices increase because they now incorporate future dividends into the price. 
Contrary to Masulis’ study (1980), Myers-Majluf’s theory (1984) predicts the opposite: 
corporations tend to issue equity when their shares are over-valued. Consistently, Masulis and 
Korwar (1986) and Vermaelen (1981) find that new stock issues lower stock prices while 
repurchases raise stock prices.  
Elton and Gruber (1970) argue in favor of the tax capitalization view by showing that 
stock prices fall on ex-dividend days. The stock price falls because the dividend is no longer 
included in the stock price. Further, the decrease in the stock price is less than the dividend 
amount due to the difference in shareholder-level dividend tax rates and capital gains tax rates. 
According to Elton and Gruber, this result demonstrates that individual-level taxes make 
dividends less attractive than capital gains. Eades et al. (1984) refute this finding by 
demonstrating that stock dividends, which are not subject to a shareholder-level tax, produce 
similar results in the stock prices on ex-dividend dates. 
By estimating firms’ implied cost of capital, Dhaliwal et al. (2005) find that firms 
operating under classical tax systems (double taxation of corporate profits), with high institutional 
ownership pay lower dividend premiums than firms with low institutional ownership. This 
dividend premium is the additional amount a firm must pay in dividends such that the dividends 
meet non-institutional shareholders’ after-tax required rates of return and supports the tax 
capitalization view. In their setting, the dividend tax penalty is the difference between the 
dividend and capital gains tax.  
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Altering the Ohlson model (1995) to incorporate shareholder-level dividend taxes, Harris 
and Kemsley (1999) find support for dividend tax capitalization. They separate book value into 
retained earnings and contributed capital. Retained earnings proxies for earnings and profits, 
which is the portion of book value subject to dividend tax since non-liquidating distributions are 
taxed as dividends to the extent of earnings and profits and then as a tax-free return of capital. 
They find that the weight placed on earnings increases while the weight placed on contributed 
capital decreases as the ratio of retained earnings to contributed capital increases. Harris and 
Kemsley claim that this supports dividend tax capitalization: as the ratio of retained earnings to 
contributed capital increases, the amount of dividend taxes to which shareholders become subject 
increases. This results in a lower emphasis on total equity since a greater portion of it is taxed. 
Harris et al. (2001) also use this methodology to demonstrate that investors value accumulated 
retained earnings less per unit that contributed capital. Using firm-level data from the United 
States, they show that the discount rate applied to dividends varies depending on the dividend tax 
rate. They confirm these findings by looking at dividend taxes in five other countries.  
However, Dhaliwal et al. (2003) and Hanlon et al. (2003) disagree with the methodology 
and interpretation of the results in both Harris and Kemsley (1999) and Harris et al. (2001). 
Dhaliwal et al. (2003) demonstrate that when looking at long-term stock returns, the conclusions 
of Harris and Kemsley (1999) are not supported. Hanlon et al. (2003) question the validity of 
incorporating the ratio of retained earnings to contributed capital into the Ohlson model (1995) 
and conclude that, given its significance, this ratio must be a proxy for a correlated omitted 
variable.  
Fama and French (1997) also look for evidence in support of the tax capitalization view 
using asset pricing models. If the tax capitalization hypothesis is true, they expect a negative 
relationship between corporate value and dividend payments. When a corporation pays dividends, 
the payout should no longer be included in the firm’s future value; thus, the stock price should 
decline. Instead, they find a positive relationship between firm value and dividends and a negative 
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relationship between leverage and value. They conclude that dividends and debt convey 
information to the market about profitability that is not captured elsewhere. 
This potential for dividend signaling and the restriction of manager discretion is 
incorporated into the third view, the double taxation view (Poterba and Summers 1985, McClure 
1977). Similar to dividend tax capitalization, this view contends that shareholder-level dividend 
taxes are an additional tax on corporate profits. The primary difference between the two views is 
the motivation behind paying dividends. The double taxation view holds that despite their tax 
disadvantage, shareholders still reward corporations when they pay dividends by increasing the 
corporate value (Poterba and Summers 1985, McClure 1977). The higher the dividend payout 
ratio, the lower the weighted average tax rate of dividends and capital gains, and the lower the 
shareholder’s required rate of return (Zodrow 1991, Poterba and Summers 1985). Thus, a 
decrease in the taxation of dividends would lower the cost of capital, increasing investment and 
the rate of return, which would result in a higher dividend payout ratio (Zodrow 1991, Poterba 
and Summers 1985). 
Using British data before and after changes in the way Great Britain taxes corporate 
retained and distributed income, Poterba and Summers (1985) find that the double taxation view 
is the closest match to their results and reject both the tax irrelevance and tax capitalization views. 
Their results show that changes in dividend taxation significantly impact ex-dividend price 
movements. Poterba and Summers (1985) also find that the announcement of a reduced dividend 
tax rate is positively related to dividend yield. They conclude that dividend taxes reduce corporate 
investment and distort capital allocations.  
McKenzie and Thompson (1995) perform an event study investigating the impact an 
increase in Canadian dividend tax had on stock prices. They compare only companies offering 
both higher-yield preferred and lower-yield common shares. They find that the decrease in the 
price of higher-yield preferred shares was significantly greater than the decrease in the price of 
lower-yield common shares. They conclude that this finding supports the double taxation and tax 
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capitalization views but not the tax irrelevance view. McKenzie and Thompson (1997) perform a 
literature review of the research on the three dividend policy theories and conclude that the 
double taxation view has the most support. Similarly, Zodrow (1991) reviews empirical studies 
testing the double taxation and the tax capitalization views and determines that the double 
taxation view has the most support.  
Ayers et al. (2002) use the Revenue Recognition Act of 1993’s increase in the highest 
individual tax rate to investigate the relationship between dividend policy and stock prices. Since 
at that time U.S. individuals paid taxes on dividends, the increase in the highest individual tax 
rate increased the dividend tax rate for shareholders in the highest bracket. Using a five-day event 
window, they find that corporations with high dividend yields experienced the largest drop in 
price and that institutional ownership mitigates this negative relationship. While both the tax 
capitalization and double taxation views predict a decrease in stock prices following this type of 
change, the tax capitalization view does not hold that the magnitude of the decrease will vary 
according to the shareholder clientele. Thus Ayers et al. (2002) conclude that the existence of the 
mitigating factor, institutional ownership, demonstrates the importance of corporate dividend 
policy and supports the double taxation view over the tax capitalization view. Dhaliwal et al. 
(2003) also use the Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1993 to investigate the effects of the increase 
in the highest individual tax bracket on stock prices. They document a positive relationship 
between dividend yield and long-term stock returns which is mitigated by institutional ownership 
which supports the traditional double taxation view.  
As this section demonstrates, prior research examines the three corporate dividend policy 
views in a variety of settings. While evidence supporting each view over the others exists, 
evidence refuting each view or its assumptions also exists. The literature has not reached a 
consensus as to the correct view.  
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Shareholder-Level Dividend Taxes 
A change in shareholder-level dividend tax creates the setting for this paper’s study. 
During this study, both New Zealand and Australia begin taxing corporate profits only once 
through dividend imputation credits. Though countries can implement such credits in a variety of 
ways, the net effect of a dividend imputation credit is to reduce the double taxation of dividends 
by reducing the tax shareholders pay on dividend income they receive. Some dividend imputation 
credits permit shareholders to exclude dividends from gross income. Others require shareholders 
to include dividends in gross income but offer credits to offset the tax liability attributable to all 
or a portion of the dividend income.  
Both the tax capitalization and the double taxation views contend that shareholder-level 
dividend taxes are an additional tax on corporate profits. The difference between the two theories 
is the motivation for paying dividends. The tax capitalization view implies that dividend policy is 
irrelevant to price in the sense that what is not paid in dividends will be capitalized into price. The 
traditional double taxation view suggests that dividend policy is extremely relevant to price since 
the market rewards corporations for paying dividends (Ayers et al. 2002).  
The results of the studies supporting the traditional double taxation view predict that a 
reduction in the taxation of dividends will result in a lower cost of capital, an increase in current 
capital investment spending, and an increase in the dividend payout ratio (McKenzie and 
Thompson 1995, Poterba and Summers 1985, McClure 1977). As demonstrated in Poterba and 
Summers (1985), the increase in the optimal dividend payout ratio stems from the fact that the 
corporation’s cost of equity decreases since, after a dividend tax decrease, it does not pay as much 
for shareholders to receive the same after-tax dividend. The firm’s marginal cost of paying 
dividends and receiving the benefit of an increase in firm value is less, increasing the optimal 
dividend payout ratio, which reduces the discount rate applied to future cash flows in determining 
the firm’s value.  
26 
R&D Corporate-Level Taxes 
This paper investigates a shareholder-level dividend tax change in countries with two 
different R&D tax treatments. Here I explain R&D investment incentives. I then review the prior 
R&D investment literature, demonstrating that the success of R&D investment incentives is still 
debated in the literature. 
Since firms often deduct R&D in the year incurred, R&D investment is tax favored in 
comparison to capital investment. Additional R&D tax incentives come in a multitude of guises. 
Tax regimes can offer R&D tax credits based on flat rates (Canada), R&D tax credits based on 
incremental rates above a base (France, Japan, Spain, and the United States), or super-
deductibility (more than 100 percent) of R&D expenses (Austria and Australia). Researchers still 
debate the effectiveness of R&D tax incentives in increasing R&D investment and the 
organizational factors influencing this investment (Hoskisson and Johnson 1992, Goel 1990, Hill 
and Snell 1989, Bradley et al. 1984, Link and Long 1981).  
Billings and Fried (1999) synthesize the R&D investment literature and test the influence 
of the U.S. tax regime and four organizational factors’ influence on R&D investment. They find 
that eligibility for the R&D incentive, the capital intensity, and the debt-to-equity ratio 
significantly impact the amounts U.S. firms invest in R&D.18 Using time-series data, Brown 
(1985) finds evidence that the U.S. R&D tax incentive included in the Economic Recovery Tax 
Act of 1981 had a positive incentive effect. Berger (1993) expands Brown’s analysis by 
separating firms in a position to take advantage of the R&D tax incentive from those not in such a 
position (based on their tax liability for the current and previous three years and the difference 
between their qualified R&D expenditures and base R&D levels). He also incorporates non-tax 
factors into his model. His results show that the U.S. R&D tax incentive of 1981 increased R&D 
investment for firms in a tax position to use the tax credit.  
                                                 
18 They do not find that unrelated diversification, defined as activity in industries outside of a company’s 
primary industry, significantly impacts R&D investment. 
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Several studies using U.S. data find results indicating an R&D tax incentive is not as 
influential as Brown (1985) and Berger (1993) indicate (Billings and McGill 1992, Mansfield 
1986, Eisner and Sullivan 1984). Using firm-level data, Eisner and Sullivan (1984) find that the 
firm-specific, moving average base R&D incentive, introduced by the United States’ Economic 
Recovery Tax Act of 1981 has limited ability to stimulate research activity. Summarily, 
Mansfield (1986) uses survey data and finds that this U.S. R&D tax incentive increased R&D 
activity less than two percent annually, about one-third of the revenue the government lost as a 
result of the credit. Billings and McGill (1992) find that, prior to the Omnibus Budget 
Reconciliation Act of 1990, which changed the R&D tax incentive from a moving-average 
formula to a fixed-base percentage formula, the average rate of credit was 2.5 percent. After 
1990, it was 1.9 percent. 
Hall and Reenen (2000) survey the international literature on R&D tax incentive 
effectiveness and conclude that the response in the United States to R&D tax incentives is greater 
than the responses in Canada and France. Further, tax incentives do not have an effect on the 
amount of R&D investment. In their survey of the literature, Hall and Reenen reference a 1993 
study by the Australian Bureau of Industry Economics as “one of the most comprehensive and 
carefully done of these [international] studies” (466). The Australian Bureau of Industry 
Economics’ study combines Australian survey and econometric data surrounding the 
implementation of super-deductibility, a 150 percent R&D tax deduction. The survey data 
indicates that for 23 percent of the respondents, super-deductibility was critical in at least one 
R&D project in the last three years, proceeding. Further, super-deductibility critically influenced 
10 percent of R&D expenditures and was significant in continuing, widening, or improving 
around 50 percent of the R&D projects. The Australian Bureau of Industry Economics’ study also 
compares the R&D growth rates, controlling for firms’ abilities to use the tax deduction, and it 
finds a benefit-cost elasticity of between 0.6 and 1.0, similar to that of the United States. Looking 
at Canada, Mansfield and Switzer (1985) do not find support for an increase in R&D spending 
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after the implementation of an R&D tax incentive. As the above studies show, the literature has 
not reached consensus concerning the ability of R&D incentives to influence R&D investment. 
Relationship Among Dividends, R&D Investment, and Tax Incentives 
This section focuses on the relationship between dividend payment and R&D investment 
when the tax incentives for each differ. Thomas et al. (2003) suggest that the reason for the mixed 
results concerning the influence of R&D incentives on R&D investment is due to the different 
ways countries tax dividends. They suggest that dividends and corporate investments compete for 
limited funds; thus, a negative relationship between dividends and R&D investment exists. 
Similarly, Smith (1995) suggests that, after implementing Australia’s dividend imputation credit, 
investors preferred companies paying higher cash dividends instead of those investing in R&D. 
Contrary to Smith (1995), Black et al. (2000) find that the dividend payout ratios in 
Australia did not increase or decrease as a result of the dividend imputation credit. They run an 
OLS regression examining the relationship between R&D investment and dividend payout ratios 
before and after Australia implemented its dividend imputation credit.19 While they do not find a 
significant relationship between R&D investment and dividend payout ratios before or after 
dividend imputation, they do find a significant negative relationship between R&D investment 
and the existence of dividend imputation. Black et al. (2000, 56) conclude “it appears that 
dividend imputation stimulated capital investment in property, plant, and equipment at the 
expense of research and development. A plausible explanation is that the more generous tax 
benefits of R&D, generated in the form of immediate expensing, lost some of their value under 
dividend imputation.” 
Thomas et al. (2003) investigate three different tax regimes: one provides incentives for 
paying dividends but not investing in R&D, one provides incentives for paying dividends and 
investing in R&D, and one providing incentives for investing in R&D but not paying dividends. 
Contrary to Black et al. (2000), they find evidence that the inverse relationship between R&D 
                                                 
19 Black et al. (2000) define dividend payout ratio as cash dividends divided by net earnings. 
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expense and total dividends paid becomes stronger when the tax regime provides both an R&D 
tax incentive and a dividend imputation credit as opposed to providing a credit for just one of 
them. However, in this same analysis, they do not find the positive relationship between R&D 
investment and R&D tax incentives which is central to the theory that the negative relationship 
between dividend payment and R&D investment becomes stronger when incentives for both 
exist. 
Thomas et al. (2003) use a dummy variable to classify each country’s tax regime. Thus, 
four of the six countries used in the study were coded “1” to indicate that their tax regime offered 
an incentive for R&D investment. Such coding assumes that the R&D tax incentives in all four 
countries do not differ. However, when Billings et al. (1994) examine the R&D investment in 
four different countries, they find that the rate of tax credit differs in each country. Further, they 
find that a significant positive relationship between R&D investment and the rate of tax credit on 
total R&D expenditures exists.  
Thomas et al.’s data also do not allow them to control for which firms within a tax regime 
can use the R&D tax incentive. Berger (1993) demonstrates the importance of incorporating a 
firm’s ability to use an R&D tax incentive. He shows that, once this is considered, the U.S. R&D 
tax incentive of 1981, which prior research declared unsuccessful as an incentive, did increase 
R&D investment for firms in a position to use it. 
In summary two papers examine the relationship between dividends, R&D investment, 
and their respective taxes. One paper uses an OLS regression to investigate dividend tax changes 
within two different countries and does not find a significant relationship between the ratio of 
cash dividends to net earnings, R&D investment, and their respective taxes (Black et al. 2000). 
The other paper, Thomas et al. (2003), performs a cross-country analysis using simultaneous 
equations and finds a significantly stronger negative relationship between total dividends paid and 
R&D investments when tax incentives for both exist. However, they do not find the theorized 
positive significant relationship between R&D expense and the existence of an R&D tax 
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incentive nor do they include countries with neither tax incentive in their comparison. Using 
different tax settings and analyses these papers reach two different conclusions regarding the 
relationship among dividends, R&D investment and their respective taxes. 
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Chapter IV 
Theoretical Development 
As shown in Partington’s (1985) funds flow identity, managers can only allocate 
resources that are actually available for allocation. The sources of these resources, external 
financing and earnings this period are allocated to the uses of these resources, this period’s 
dividends and investments.  
D  + I = C + Y   t t t t∆ ∆  (7)
where 
Dt = Dividends in period t; 
∆It = Net change in investment in period t; 
∆Ct = Net change in external financing in period t; and  
Yt = Earnings in period t. 
Uses of resources appear on the left-hand side of equation (7).20 They are expressed as 
current period dividends and net change in investments.21 These uses of resources equal the 
available resources, which are comprised of net change in external financing (∆Ct) and earnings 
(Yt). As is typical with theoretical models, several assumptions are necessary for this identity to 
hold. First, the firm must operate on a cash-only basis such that all earnings and new external 
capital are readily available for dividends or investments. Second, the firm must pay dividends or 
invest all of its earnings and new external capital each period. The first assumption that the firm 
operates on a cash-only basis can be removed by replacing external financing (∆Ct) and earnings 
(Yt) with net cash flows into the firm.  
ttttt OCFBRDICFBNIFCFBD  I D ++=+  (8)
where    
                                                 
20Though share repurchases are a potential use of firm funds, they are not included in this discussion 
because (1) New Zealand did not permit share repurchases during the time period used in this study and (2) 
Australia permitted regulated repurchases only during the last three years of this study. 
21The term “net change in investments” incorporates the difference in all firm investments made during the 
current period.  
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It = New investments made in period t 
FCFBRDt = Cash flow in period t from financing activities before dividends;  
ICFBRDt = Cash flow in period t from investing activities before new investments; and 
OCFBRDt = Cash flow in period t from operating activities before R&D expenses.  
Net change in investment (∆It ) becomes new investments (It) because any cash received this 
period for an investment previously held will appear in cash flow from investing activities before 
new investments (ICFBNIt). If the firm then acquires another asset with this cash, the new asset 
will appear in new investments (It).22 The equation still assumes that the firm chooses to pay 
dividends or increase investment with all of the cash that it has available. 
R&D Investment Incentives 
As evidenced in Thomas et al. (2003), tax regimes can provide varying incentives for 
R&D investment, investment in other assets, and dividend payments to shareholders. In a tax 
regime providing no incentive to pay dividends but an additional incentive for R&D investment, 
allocating limited resources to continued funding of old R&D projects or funding new R&D 
projects lowers taxes the corporations pay and, thus, increases the net cash flow from operations. 
Separating R&D investment from all other new investments and incorporating the tax savings 
from R&D investment results in the following:   
ttttt tt R OCFBRDICFBNIFCFBDR  O D δ+++=++  (9)
where  
Ot = All new investments other than R&D; 
Rt = R&D investment; and   
δ = rate of R&D investment tax incentive.  
                                                 
22 For example, a firm sells a building for $25,000 cash and then uses $20,000 of it to purchase equipment. 
The $25,000 cash will appear on the right-hand side of the equation in cash flow from investing activities 
before new investments (ICFBRDt) and the $20,000 will appear on the left-hand side of the equation in 
new investments (It). The $5,000 difference will also appear on the left-hand side in the form of a different 
new investment or dividends. 
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R&D investment now costs less than other investments or dividend payments. Assuming funds 
are fixed, firms have an increased incentive to invest more heavily in R&D. Depending on the 
extent to which firms choose to use the tax incentive by investing in R&D, either investment in 
other assets or dividend payments may decrease.  
Dividend Tax Incentives 
In a tax regime providing no incentive for R&D investment but granting an incentive for 
dividend payments and assuming the double taxation view, allocating funds to paying dividends 
reduces the cost of capital which results in dividends becoming more attractive than other 
investments, including R&D. This alters equation (9) as follows: 
 OCFBRDICFBNI  λDFCFBDR  O D ttttt tt +++=++  (10)
where λ represents the reduced cost of equity capital resulting from a dividend imputation credit.  
When a country previously not offering R&D investment or dividend payment incentives 
implements dividend imputation credits, corporations paying dividends should realize a decrease 
in their cost of equity capital because a dividend imputation credit reduces or eliminates the 
double taxation of dividends (Dhaliwal et al. 2003). By providing shareholders a tax credit for 
dividends received or omitting dividends from shareholders’ net incomes, shareholders no longer 
pay tax on the dividends. Corporations operating under these tax regimes actually have to pay less 
in dividends for shareholders to receive the same after-tax returns; this reduces the corporation’s 
cost of equity capital (Dhaliwal et al. 2003). Further, an imputation credit provides incentives for 
corporations to switch from debt to equity financing, which also lowers their average cost of 
capital and could increase corporations’ investment in equipment and structures (Black et al. 
2000, Schulman et al. 1996, Auerbach and Hassett 1991, Cummins and Hassett 1992). 
R&D Investment and Dividend Tax Incentives 
What happens when the tax regime implements both incentives to pay dividends and to 
invest in R&D? Mathematically, the inverse relationship between R&D investment and dividend 
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payment will increase in firms paying dividends. As evidenced by combining equations (9) and 
(10), this should help equate R&D investment and dividend payments since both increase the 
firm’s available cash flow. 
tR OCFBRDICFBNI  D FCFBDR  O D ttttt tt δλ ++++=++  (11)
Firms paying dividends now have an incentive to invest in R&D (δRt) and pay dividends (λDt). 
Dividend-paying firms will have more difficulty allocating funds to R&D investments, dividend 
payments, or other investments than if only one tax incentive existed. Every dollar they contribute 
to paying dividends will increase their savings from the reduced cost of capital (λDt); however, 
every dollar they use to pay dividends will reduce the funds available for R&D investment and 
thus the R&D investment tax savings (δRt). Therefore, tax regimes offering both tax incentives 
for R&D investment and dividend payments should exhibit the greatest inverse ratio between 
R&D investments and dividend payouts. While the increase in the inverse ratio could result from 
simply holding R&D investment constant and placing the savings from the lower cost of capital 
into dividend payments, it could also result from decreasing R&D investment to further increase 
dividend payment. 
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Chapter V 
Hypothesis Development 
In July of 1985, Australia implemented an R&D investment tax incentive in the form of 
super-deductibility. Super-deductibility permitted companies to deduct 150 percent of their R&D 
expenses. While New Zealand did not offer an explicit tax R&D incentive, R&D expenses were 
100 percent deductible.23 Before the respective 1987 and 1988 tax changes, neither Australia nor 
New Zealand offered dividend imputation credits. Theoretically, I expect to find a negative 
relationship between dividend payment and R&D expense regardless of tax incentives or 
dividend tax views.24  
When a corporation invests in R&D, it will have fewer funds available for capital 
investments or dividend payments. Thomas et al. (2003) find a negative relationship between 
R&D investment and dividend payment when looking at the United Kingdom, Canada, France, 
Germany, Japan and the United States. When looking at New Zealand and Australia, Black et al. 
(2000), do not find a significant relationship between R&D investment and dividend payment in 
either country. Given the mixed results, I investigate the relationship between R&D investment 
and dividend payment and between R&D investment and capital expenditures. The signs of these 
relationships, themselves, are not crucial to my study. I am interested in what happens to the 
relationships as the tax regimes change. Therefore, I need to know what the relationships look 
like in the countries prior to the tax regime changes. To test these relationships, I define two tax 
regimes. As Table 2 shows, Tax Regime I provides incentives for neither R&D investment nor 
dividend payments (corresponding to Australia prior to July 1985 and New Zealand prior to 
                                                 
23I use the same classification approach as Thomas et al. (2003) and do not classify countries with only a 
100 percent R&D deduction as ones offering incentives for investment in R&D.  
24 My first two hypotheses focus on relationships among R&D investment, dividends, and MTRs at a point 
in time and, thus, are not indicative of a particular dividend policy view.  
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1988) and Tax Regime II provides only R&D investment incentives (corresponding to Australia 
from July 1985 to June 1987).25 The first hypothesis is:26 
H1a: A negative relationship between a firm’s R&D investment and capital investment  
will exist in both Tax Regimes I and II.  
H1b: A negative relationship between a firm’s R&D investment and dividend payment  
will exist in both Tax Regimes I and II. 
            The monetary benefit an R&D tax incentive provides is not the same for all firms within a 
country (Billings and Fried 1999, Billings et al. 1994, Berger 1993, Brown 1985). The marginal 
rate of credit and the average rate of credit typically measure the benefit an R&D incentive 
provides corporations (Eisner and Sullivan 1984, Altshuler 1989, Billings et al. 1994). The 
average rate of credit measures the tax credit received on total R&D expenditures while the 
marginal rate of credit indicates the tax credit a corporation will receive from investing an 
additional dollar in R&D (Billings et al. 1994). Since the R&D tax incentives in Australia and 
New Zealand are both in the form of deductions, a firm’s MTR indicates the tax benefits it will 
receive from an additional dollar of R&D investment. Firms with higher MTRs should invest 
more in R&D since they receive more benefit from R&D expenses than firms with lower MTRs. 
Thus, prior to each of the tax changes in Australia (July 1985 and July 1987) and the tax change 
in New Zealand (April 1988), firms positioned to benefit from the R&D deduction should have 
invested more heavily in R&D.  
H2: A positive relationship between a firm’s R&D expense and MTR will exist in both  
       Tax Regimes I and II.  
                                                 
25 Due to the implementation of dividend imputation in July of 1987, Australia was a country offering only 
an R&D investment tax incentive for only two years. However, as cited on page 489 of Australia’s Industry 
Commission 1995 Research and Development Report, “The largest year-on-year increases in BERD 
[Business Enterprise R&D] during the complete decade occurred in 1985-86 and 1986-87.” This is despite 
a 15 percent per year rate of increase in BERD from 1981-82 to 1984-85. 
26All hypotheses appear in alternative form.  
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Effect of R&D Investment Incentives in the Absence of Dividend Imputation  
 In July of 1985, the R&D tax deduction for R&D investment in Australia increased from 
100 percent to 150 percent.27 This allowed Australian companies to receive more tax benefit from 
R&D investment. As equation (11) shows, when a tax regime moves from offering neither an 
R&D investment tax incentive nor dividend imputation (defined as Tax Regime I) to offering an 
R&D investment tax incentive (defined as Tax Regime II), the relationship between R&D 
investment and dividend payment changes. At this point in time, firms began receiving additional 
savings from investing in R&D as compared with paying dividends. Therefore, when Australia 
implemented its R&D investment tax incentive in 1985, the relationship between R&D 
investment and dividend payment should have become weaker (less negative). 
H3: When a country moves from Tax Regime I to Tax Regime II, there will be a weaker  
       relationship between R&D investment and dividend payment. 
Effect of Dividend Imputation in the Absence of Explicit R&D Incentives 
As stated above, when a country offers tax incentives for only R&D investment (equation 
(9)) or only dividend payment (equation (10)), the inverse relationship between the two should 
not be as strong as when the tax regime does not offer a tax incentive for either of them (equation 
(8)). However, the dividend policy views vary in their predictions of the effects of a dividend 
imputation credit. As summarized in Table 3, Panel A, the tax irrelevance view predicts that 
dividend imputation credits will not change the dividend payment or the relationship between 
R&D investment and dividend payment. Similarly, the tax capitalization view states that any 
change in the dividend payment is the result of a change in the firm’s corporate investment 
opportunities; thus, a dividend imputation credit will not change the firm’s corporate investment 
policy. 
                                                 
27 The implementation of super-deductibility, a 150 percent R&D deduction, alters the calculation of 
corporate taxes. It does not offer a setting in which to analyze the dividend policy views since all three 
views contend that a change in corporate taxes could alter corporate investments or dividend payments. 
Hypotheses 4, 6, 7, and 9 use the dividend tax changes in 1987 and 1988 to investigate which dividend 
policy view is most supportable. 
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Only the double taxation view of dividend policy suggests that a change in the way 
dividends are taxed will alter the dividend payment. According to this view, the market rewards 
dividend-paying firms by increasing stock prices when firms pay dividends. A decrease in the 
dividend tax decreases the amount of pre-tax dividend necessary for shareholders to receive the 
same after-tax dividend. This reduction in the cost of equity capital reduces the firm’s cost of 
receiving the market’s reward of an increased stock price. Thus, capital investment and the 
dividend payout ratio will increase (Poterba and Summers 1985, 4). As mentioned earlier, prior 
corporate dividend policy research does not address R&D investment alone. Instead it either 
includes it as part of capital investment or excludes it completely. Thus, the double taxation view 
of corporate dividend policy does not predict a direction for the change in R&D investment 
(Table 3, Panel A). Following a decrease in dividend taxes, the increases in the capital investment 
and dividend payment predicted by the double taxation view have to be funded by either the 
decrease in the average cost of capital, newly raised capital or as suggested by Thomas et al. 
(2003), a decrease in R&D investments. New Zealand’s 1988 tax change provides a setting in 
which to explore these relationships and dividend views.  
In 1988, New Zealand changed its tax regime from one offering tax incentives for neither 
R&D investment nor dividend payment to one offering tax incentives for paying dividends.28 
According to Thomas et al. (2003), after this change, New Zealand firms that typically paid 
dividends should have now found paying dividends more attractive than investing in R&D. At 
this time, New Zealand also decreased its highest corporate tax rate by 15 percentage points (from 
48 to 33 percent). This reduced the tax benefit of the implicit incentive for R&D investment, 
making the incentive for the payment of dividends even stronger. This does not alter the 
predictions under the double taxation view. However, corporate tax rates affect the cost of capital 
calculation under both the tax irrelevance and tax capitalization views of corporate dividend 
                                                 
28New Zealand did continue to offer immediate deduction of 100 percent of the R&D expenses. To be 
consistent with prior literature, the 100 percent deduction is not classified as an explicit incentive to invest 
in R&D. 
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policy. Reducing the cost of capital results in an increase in capital investments according to both 
of these views (McKenzie and Thompson 1997, Zodrow 1991, Poterba and Summers 1985, 
Miller and Scholes 1978). Panels A and B of Table 3 summarize the effects these tax changes 
should have on dividend-paying firms and their R&D investment, capital investment, and 
dividend payment according to the three views of how dividend taxes affect corporate dividend 
policies. Defining Tax Regime III as providing only a tax incentive for dividend payment (Table 
2), the forth hypothesis is as follows: 
H4a: When a country moves from Tax Regime I to Tax Regime III, dividend-paying  
firms will alter their R&D investment.29 
H4b: When a country moves from Tax Regime I to Tax Regime III, dividend-paying  
firms will increase their capital investment. 
H4c: When a country moves from Tax Regime I to Tax Regime III, dividend-paying  
firms will increase their dividend payment. 
As equation (10) demonstrates, the implementation of the dividend imputation credit 
makes paying dividends more attractive than R&D investment or other assets. Firms will receive 
more benefit from the decrease in the cost of capital as they pay more in dividends. The decision 
to pay dividends should be easier than when neither a tax incentive for R&D investment or 
dividend payment exists or when incentives for both exist (equation 11). Thus, the relationship 
between R&D investment and dividend payment should become weaker (less negative).  
H5a: When a country moves from Tax Regime I to Tax Regime III, there will be a          
          weaker relationship between R&D investment and dividend payment in dividend-    
         paying firms. 
Despite the reduction in the highest corporate tax rate, New Zealand dividend-paying 
firms with higher MTRs should have found R&D investments an attractive option since they 
                                                 
29 When all of the corporate dividend policy views predict no change or do not provide a prediction, the 
hypothesis is non-directional.  
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could claim the 100 percent R&D deduction. Dividend-paying firms with lower MTRs were not 
in as advantageous a position to use the R&D deduction. Thus, the weakening of the relationship 
between R&D investing and paying dividends should be smaller for firms with higher MTRs than 
firms with lower MTRs. 
H5b: When a country moves from Tax Regime I to Tax Regime III, the weakening of  
dividend-paying firms’ relationship between R&D expense and dividend payment 
will be greater among those firms with lower MTRs. 
The tax irrelevance and tax capitalization views suggest that the implementation of a 
dividend imputation credit will not affect the dividend payment in firms not typically paying 
dividends (Table 4, Panel A). According to the tax irrelevance view, shareholder-level taxes do 
not affect dividend payments; thus, any change in dividend taxation is irrelevant. The tax 
capitalization view holds that implementing a dividend tax change will not change the dividend 
payment (Poterba and Summers 1985). While both views contend that it should not alter dividend 
payments, decreasing the highest corporate tax rate reduces the cost of capital, increasing capital 
investment (Table 4, Panel B).  
While the double taxation view holds that dividend taxes affect dividend policy, 
shareholders of non-dividend-paying firms do not expect to receive dividends. Since these firms 
have not been paying dividends, they will not experience tax savings from lower equity costs 
(Table 4, Panel A). However, decreasing corporate tax rates also reduces the cost of capital under 
the double taxation view and increases capital investments (Table 4, Panel B).  
H6a: When a country moves from Tax Regime I to Tax Regime III, non-dividend-paying  
         firms will alter R&D investment. 
H6b: When a country moves from Tax Regime I to Tax Regime III, non-dividend-paying  
         firms will increase capital investment. 
H6c: When a country moves from Tax Regime I to Tax Regime III, non-dividend-paying 
firms will not alter dividend payment. 
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Effect of Dividend Imputation in the Presence of Explicit R&D Incentives 
Australia’s 1987 tax change also provides a setting in which to test the relationships 
among the uses of firm resources and the views of what affects corporate dividend policy. In July 
of 1987, Australia altered its tax regime from one offering tax incentives only for R&D 
investment (defined as Tax Regime II) to one offering tax incentives both for R&D investment 
and dividend payments (defined as Tax Regime IV). According to the double taxation view, the 
implementation of a dividend imputation credit will directly impact the payment of dividends in 
dividend-paying firms (Table 3, Panel C). The dividend imputation credit allows firms to pay less 
in dividends while shareholders receive the same after-tax dividend payment. The reduced equity 
costs make paying dividends and capital investments attractive uses of firm resources (Poterba 
and Summers 1985, 4).  
At this time, Australia also implemented a capital gains tax. A capital gains tax would not 
cause a change in the dividend payment or investment policy under the tax irrelevance view. The 
tax capitalization view contends that implementing a capital gains tax will decrease the after-tax 
appreciation shareholders receive when they sell their stock (Table 3, Panel D). In turn, this will 
increase the cost of capital and discourage capital investment (McKenzie and Thompson 1997, 9). 
Under the double taxation view, the cost of capital depends on a weighted average of shareholder-
level dividend taxes and capital gains taxes. An increase in capital gains taxes alone would 
increase a firm’s cost of capital. This increase in the cost of capital would decrease investments 
and dividend payout ratios. However, when coupled with dividend imputation which as discussed 
above, has the opposite effect on the cost of capital, it is not possible to predict the movement in 
R&D investment, capital investment, or dividend payment. 
H7a: When a country moves from Tax Regime II to Tax Regime IV, dividend-paying 
firms will alter R&D investment. 
H7b: When a country moves from Tax Regime II to Tax Regime IV, dividend-paying 
firms will increase capital investment.  
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H7c: When a country moves from Tax Regime II to Tax Regime IV, dividend-paying 
firms will increase dividend payment.  
As equation (11) demonstrates, when a country offers tax incentives for both R&D 
investment and dividend payment, the savings a firm receives from the R&D tax incentive 
depends on the amount invested in R&D, and the savings a firm receives from the decrease in the 
cost of capital depends on the amount of dividends they pay. After 1987, Australia’s tax regime 
offered tax incentives for both R&D investment and dividend payment. Since both R&D 
investment and dividend payments pose tax advantages, the decision to participate in one over the 
other became more difficult than when a tax credit for only one of them existed. This should 
strengthen the relationship between these two uses of firm funds.  
H8a: When a country moves from Tax Regime II to Tax Regime IV, there will be a  
                      stronger relationship between R&D investment and dividend payment in  
                      dividend-paying firms. 
Adding a dividend tax credit to a tax regime offering an R&D tax incentive reduces the 
difference in the tax benefit provided by R&D investment and dividend payment (equation (11)). 
Further, firms with lower MTRs versus firms with higher MTRs will not find it as difficult to 
increase dividend payment since the R&D tax incentive was not extremely beneficial to them. On 
the other hand, firms with higher MTRs will find it harder to switch from investing in R&D to 
paying dividends since R&D investment results in a high (150 percent) tax deduction.  
H8b: When a country moves from Tax Regime II to Tax Regime IV, the increase in   
         strength of dividend-paying firms’ relationships between R&D expense and  
         dividend payment will be greater among those firms with higher MTRs. 
All three views of corporate dividend policy contend that non-dividend-paying firms 
would not be affected by the implementation of dividend imputation (Table 4, Panel C). 
However, a capital gains tax causes shareholders to pay a tax on any profit they received when 
selling their shares. According to the tax capitalization view, any change in dividend payment 
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which occurs after a dividend imputation credit is merely the result of a change in the firm’s 
investment decision, unless coupled with a capital gains tax (Zodrow 1991, Poterba and Summers 
1985). Since capital gains taxes hinder corporate investments, it is plausible that under the tax 
capitalization view, firms would begin paying dividends (Table 4, Panel D).  
 The double taxation view also contends that non-dividend-paying firms may begin 
paying dividends because: (1) with the implementation of the capital gains tax, shareholders will 
have to pay tax on the profit they receive when they sell their stock, and (2) coupled with the 
capital gains tax and dividend imputation credit, shareholders will prefer that these firms begin 
paying dividends (Poterba and Summers 1985). This assumes of course that the reduction in 
dividend tax has a greater impact on the cost of capital calculation than the implementation of a 
capital gains tax. 
H9a: When a country moves from Tax Regime II to Tax Regime IV, non-dividend- 
         paying firms will alter R&D investment.  
H9b: When a country moves from Tax Regime II to Tax Regime IV, non-dividend-     
         paying firms will increase capital investment.  
H9c: When a country moves from Tax Regime II to Tax Regime IV, non-dividend- 
         paying firms will increase dividend payment.  
Further, the double taxation view contends that firms with lower MTRs receive less tax 
benefit from R&D investment. These firms will find it more tax efficient, vis-à-vis higher MTR 
firms, to pay dividends instead of subjecting shareholders to greater capital gains taxes by 
investing the funds in retained earnings, R&D, or other assets.  
H10a: When a country moves from Tax Regime II to Tax Regime IV, the change in non- 
           dividend-paying firms’ R&D investment will be greater among those firms with  
           lower MTRs. 
  H10b: When a country moves from Tax Regime II to Tax Regime IV, the change in non- 
           dividend-paying firms’ capital investment will be greater among those firms with   
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           lower MTRs. 
H10c: When a country moves from Tax Regime II to Tax Regime IV, the increase in  
          non-dividend-paying firms’ dividend payment will be greater among those firms  
          with lower MTRs. 
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Chapter VI 
Research Design 
 As previously discussed, this paper assumes that the decisions of R&D investment and 
dividend payment occur simultaneously. The theory supports a relationship between these two 
uses of funds. This paper tests and builds on the only paper explicitly investigating the 
relationship between R&D investment and dividend payments, Thomas et al. (2003) which 
assumes that the decision to invest in R&D is not totally independent of the dividend payment 
decision or other capital expenditures.30 For comparability, this study uses a similar set of 
simultaneous equations, which consists of a model for R&D investment and a model for dividend 
payment. Also this section introduces three new variables to the set of simultaneous equations 
used to test the hypotheses—the corporate before-R&D MTR, the individual tax rate, and the 
statutory tax rate for corporations.  
R&D Investment Model 
In the first of the simultaneous equations models, the R&D investment model, the 
dependent variable is the R&D expense the firm reported in the current year. It is not deflated by 
sales; instead, the natural log of total sales is included as a control variable (Thomas et al. 2003, 
Barth and Kallapur 1996). The independent variables are the before-R&D MTR and the dividend 
payment. Since R&D is tax deductible, a firm lowers its MTR when it invests in R&D. Similar to 
the before-financing MTR variable in Graham et al. (1998), the before-R&D MTR (BRDMTR) 
variable measures the MTR prior to the firm investing in R&D. After adding the R&D expense to 
the taxable income, I derive Shelvin’s (1990) trichotomous variable. The trichotomous variable 
equals the top statutory rate if the corporation has positive taxable income but not a net operating 
                                                 
30 Several papers investigate the relationship between financing, investing, and paying dividends. Smirlock 
and Marshall (1983) use Granger causality to see if dividend decisions influence investment decisions. 
They conclude that dividends are not causal related to investments. Mougoue and Mukherjee (1994) 
incorporate financing decisions into this methodology and determine that the three activities are 
independent. However, investment consisted of plant, property, and equipment in both studies, so they did 
not consider R&D investment.  
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loss (NOL) carryforward from prior years, one-half of the statutory rate if the corporation has 
negative taxable income (i.e., a current year NOL) or an NOL carryforward but not both, and zero 
if the firm has negative taxable income and an NOL carryforward. The second dependent 
variable, the dividend payout (DIVPAY) is the total amount paid in dividends for the current 
year. It is the product of the dividend payment per share and the number of shares outstanding.  
As in Thomas et al. (2003), the model includes controls for the funds available, the firm’s 
financial position, and external influences. Research has shown that the ability to invest in R&D 
depends on available funds. The two-year average of cash from operations (AVGOPCF) and cash 
from financing (AVGFCF) proxy for these funds. Also included is the amount of capital 
investment (CAPEX); funds invested in capital are not available for R&D investment.  
Firms under financial distress are less likely to invest in R&D because firm-specific 
assets created through R&D cannot easily be used to pay down debt (Bhagat and Welch 1995). 
The firm’s beginning-of-the-year debt-to-assets ratio (DEBT) measures the firm’s financial 
distress. Research shows that managers incorporate the effect R&D investment will have on 
current-period earnings when determining the R&D outlay (Baber et al. 1991, Elliot et al. 1984). 
Thus, the current level of earnings before taxes and research (EBTR) is included as a control 
variable. The model includes controls for the firm’s size (SIZE) and last year’s R&D expense 
(LRDX) since they have both been shown to influence the current year’s R&D investment 
(Berger 1993, Tillinger 1991).  
 The model controls for external influences through the inclusion of Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) and the firm’s book-value-to-market-value ratio (B/M). The Gross Domestic 
Product captures the economic variations and serves as a control variable for time since the data 
is annual. As in Thomas et al. (2003), the book-value-to-market-value ratio proxies for Tobin’s q, 
a measurement of the marginal benefit to the marginal cost of an additional unit of investment 
(Tillinger 1991). This variable captures the marginal benefit in terms of the value the market 
places on the investment. It does not capture the benefit through the tax savings the before-R&D 
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MTR variable captures. This variable also speaks to the line of research indicating that the market 
capitalizes R&D and that market value is a determinant of R&D spending (Green et al. 1996, Lev 
and Sougiannis 1996). 
I include two additional control variables that Thomas et al. (2003) did not, the maximum 
individual tax rate (IRATE) and the maximum statutory corporate tax rate (CRATE). The tax 
reforms investigated in this study include significant reductions in both the corporate and 
individual income tax rates. Since both of these rates affect corporate investment, I include them 
as controls.31 
Dividend Payment Model  
The dividend payment model is similar to the R&D investment model. This equation 
serves to complete the simultaneous system of equations. The dependent variable, dividend 
payment (DIVPAY) is the same as that in the R&D investment model. The before-R&D MTR 
(BRDMTR) is included to distinguish between firms that can and cannot benefit from R&D tax 
incentives. Firms which cannot benefit from R&D tax incentives would be more likely to pay 
dividends. The R&D spending (RDX) is included since it is a competing use of the funds. The 
controls in this equation are similar to those in the R&D investment model. The proxies for funds 
available are the two-year average of cash from operations (AVGOPCF) and cash from financing 
(AVGFCF). The amount of capital investment (CAPEX) captures an alternative way of investing 
the firm’s funds. The maximum individual tax rate (IRATE) and maximum corporate tax rate 
(CRATE) are also included to control for the effect tax rates can have on corporate investment.  
Partington (1989) finds the cost of financing also influences dividend payment. The 
firm’s beginning-of-the-year debt-to-assets ratio (DEBT) proxies for this cost. Partington (1989) 
finds that profitability is the most important determinant of dividend policy. Thus, the current 
                                                 
31 Again, share repurchases are not included because, at this time, they were not permitted in New Zealand, 
and Australia did not permit them until 1991. From 1991 to 1995, Australian repurchases (buy-backs) were 
highly regulated, and only 44 companies (less then four percent of the Australian Stock Exchange) 
participated in them (Mitchell and Robinson 1996) compared to 50 percent of the companies in the New 
York Stock Exchange from 1954 to 1963 (Guthart 1965). 
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level of earnings before taxes and research expenditures (EBTR) is included as a control variable. 
He also finds that managers consider the effects dividend policy can have on share price. The 
market penalizes firms typically paying dividends when they omit dividend payments (Akhigbe 
and Madura 1996). Thus, last year’s dividend payment (LDIVPAY) is included in the model. 
Size is included as another proxy for one of Partington’s dividend determinants, the cost 
of financing. Two additional control variables, the percent change in earnings growth (EGROW) 
and the proportion of return received from capital gains (CAPRET) are also included in the 
dividend model. The percent change in earnings (EGROW) captures company growth. Alli et al. 
(1993) show that firms with high growth are less likely to pay dividends since the retained funds 
can help finance future growth. Investors also can receive returns on investment through capital 
gains. This is captured in the proportion of return received from capital gains (CAPRET), 
measured as the annual return provided to investors through price appreciation.  
The system of equations is as follows: 
R&D Investment Model (12)
RDX = α1 + β11BRDMTR + β21DIVPAY + β31AVGOPCF + β41AVGFCF + β51CAPEX 
+ β61DEBT + β71EBTR + β81LRDX + β91SIZE + β101GDP + β111B/M + β121CRATE + 
β131IRATE + β141IMPCRED + β151IMPCRED*BRDMTR + β161IMPCRED*CAPEX + 
β171IMPCRED*DIVPAY + ε 
Dividend Payment Model   (13)
DIVPAY = α2 + β12 BRDMTR + β22RDX + β32AVGOPCF + β42AVGFCF + β52CAPEX 
+ β62DEBT + β72EBTR + β82LDIVPAY + β92SIZE + β102EGROW + β112CAPRET + 
β122CRATE + β132IRATE + β142IMPCRED + ε 
where 
RDX = reported R&D expense (Worldscope Database item 0119) 
BRDMTR = before-R&D marginal tax rate calculated by adding R&D expense 
to the taxable income and then determining Shelvin’s (1990) 
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trichotomous variable; Shelvin’s (1990) trichotomous variable 
equals the top statutory rate if the corporation has before-R&D 
taxable income and no NOL carryforward, one-half of this rate if 
the corporation has negative before-R&D taxable income or an 
NOL carryforward but not both, and zero if the firm has negative 
before-R&D taxable income and an NOL carryforward; 
 
DIVPAY = dividend payment or total cash dividends paid (4551); 
AVGOPCF = average cash from operations for the current and prior years, 
which is the sum of income before extraordinary items and 
preferred dividends (1551), depreciation, depletion, and 
amortization (1151) and R&D expense (1201); 
 
AVGFCF = average cash from financing for the current and prior years, which 
is the sum of change in long-term debt (3251) and change in 
common equity (3501) minus the difference between net income 
after preferred dividends (1706) and common dividends (5376); 
 
CAPEX = capital expenditures (4601); 
DEBT = beginning-of-the-year debt-to-assets ratio, which is the sum of 
total assets (2999) less common equity (3501) and preferred stock 
(3451) divided by total assets (2999); 
 
EBTR = earnings before taxes and research spending, which is the sum of 
pretax income (1401) and R&D expense (1201); 
 
LRDX = R&D expense for the prior year; 
 
SIZE = natural log of total sales (1001); 
GDP = gross domestic product; 
B/M = beginning-of-the-year book-to-market ratio, which is market 
capitalization (8001) divided by common equity (3501); 
 
EGROW = earnings growth, which is the percent change in pretax earnings 
(1401) from the previous year to the current year; 
 
CAPRET = capital return, which is the annual return to the shareholders 
through price appreciation measured as market capitalization 
(8001) divided by common equity (3501); 
 
CRATE = statutory corporate tax rate; 
 
IRATE = statutory individual tax rate; and 
IMPCRED = a dummy variable equaling one when a dividend imputation credit 
is available. 
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Since R&D spending and dividend payment are determined in conjunction with one 
another and the variables in the two equations are related, I use three stage least squares (3SLS) to 
run the system of equations.32 This method allows for the possibility of contemporaneous 
correlation between the disturbances in the two structural equations (Johnston and DiNardo 1997, 
317). The first two stages of 3SLS are similar to two stage least squares (2SLS). The first stage 
obtains the predicted values for the endogenous regressors. The second stage uses the predicted 
values from stage one to estimate the equations’ errors and then uses these to estimate the 
contemporaneous variance-covariance matrix of the structural equations’ errors. Finally the third 
stage obtains the estimates by applying generalized least squares to the large equation, which 
consists of the system of equations (Mukherjee et al. 1998, 450). 
Data Selection 
To test the hypotheses, I examine pooled cross-section firm-year Australian and New 
Zealand data from the fiscal year ending 1982 to the fiscal year ending 1993. Where available, the 
data comes from the Worldscope Global Researcher Database via Thompson Financial and 
Datastream Advance 4.0. The remainder of the data is hand-collected from the Australian 
Graduate School of Management Annual Report File and the Australian Stock Exchange annual 
reports housed in Perth, Western Australia. I delete firm-years where the data needed to calculate 
the regressions are unavailable.33 Further, only domestic firms are kept in the sample since these 
are the firms which will be most affected by a tax change in their country. Consistent with 
Thomas et al. (2003), this paper defines domestic firms as those with (1) less than 50 percent of 
their total sales due to foreign sales, (2) less than 50 percent of their total assets located abroad, 
                                                 
32 3SLS differs from 2SLS in that it estimates all of the parameters of the model jointly while 2SLS 
estimates only the identified structural equation of interest. The 3SLS estimator is consistent and 
asymptotically more efficient than the 2SLS estimator. 
33 One of the proxies for funds available, average financing cash flows, requires the availability of firm data 
for at least two years prior to being included in the sample. Thus three years of consecutive data must be 
available for the firm to be included in the sample. 
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and (3) less than 50 percent of their total income due to foreign income. The complete sample 
contains 695 firm-year observations.  
Descriptive Statistics 
Table 5 displays the means and medians of the variables for each country. Similar to 
Black et al.’s (2000) paper investigating tax changes in New Zealand and Australia, New Zealand 
firms compose approximately 10 percent of the sample.34 The means of the dependent variable of 
interest, R&D expense (RDX) are not statistically different in the two countries. The mean for the 
before-R&D MTR (BTRMTR) is 25 percent in New Zealand which is lower than the highest 
corporate statutory rate in New Zealand, indicating the presence of an NOL or negative taxable 
income. The average prior year’s R&D expense (LRDX) is less than the current year’s average in 
both countries. The means of dividend payment (DIVPAY), average operating cash flow 
(AGVOPCF), gross domestic product (GDP), prior year dividend payment (LDIVPAY), and 
growth in earnings (EGROW) are much higher in Australia than in New Zealand. Except for the 
gross domestic product, the medians of these variables are similar, indicating skewness in the 
average calculations.  
Tables 6 through 8 contain the Pearson correlation matrices for the combined sample, 
New Zealand sample, and Australian sample, respectively. As in Black et al. (2000), the measures 
for dividend imputation, corporate tax rate, and individual tax rates are highly correlated. The 
corporate and individual tax rates are included to control for changes in these statutory rates. The 
dividend imputation dummy variable is included to determine changes related to dividend 
imputation.  
                                                 
34 In Black et al.’s (2000) paper, New Zealand firms compose 13.5 percent of the sample. 
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Chapter VII 
Results 
Running the set of simultaneous equations shown in equations (12) and (13) on the New 
Zealand and Australian samples of firm-years separately, tests the first hypothesis. Table 9 
contains the New Zealand results.35 The model includes a dummy variable indicating the 
existence of dividend imputation (IMPCRED) and its interaction with dividend payment 
(IMPCRED*DIVPAY) and capital expenditures (IMPCRED*CAPEX). Therefore the dividend 
payment variable (DIVPAY) and capital expenditure variable (CAPEX) capture the period where 
neither an R&D investment tax incentive nor dividend payment tax incentive exist, Tax Regime 
I.36 In Tax Regime I, using New Zealand data, the relationships between R&D expenses and 
capital expenditures (CAPEX) and between R&D expenses and dividend payment (DIVPAY) are 
in the predicted direction but insignificant.37 This does not provide support for H1a nor H1b in 
New Zealand’s Tax Regime I. 
Table 10 contains the results of running the set of simultaneous equations on the 
Australian sample of firm-years prior to dividend imputation (from July 1981 to June 1985). The 
model includes a dummy variable indicating the existence of an R&D tax incentive 
(R&DINCENT) and its interaction with dividend payment (R&DINCENT*DIVPAY) and capital 
expenditures (R&DINCENT*CAPEX). Therefore the dividend payment variable (DIVPAY) and 
capital expenditure variable (CAPEX) capture the period where neither an R&D investment tax 
incentive nor dividend payment tax incentive exist, Tax Regime I. Due to the high correlation 
between the individual tax rate (IRATE), corporate tax rate (CRATE), and the before-MTR 
                                                 
35 The dividend payment model controls for the interdependence in the system of equations. Thus, 
throughout the paper, I use the results from the R&D model to answer my research questions.  
36 Due to the multicollinearity between the individual tax rate (IRATE), the corporate tax rate (CRATE) 
and the before-MTR variable (BRDMTR), I also run the system of simultaneous equations without the 
corporate tax rate, without the individual tax rate, and without either tax rates. The results do not change. 
37 Not finding a significant relationship between R&D investment and dividend payment in New Zealand is 
consistent with Black et al.’s (2000) finding when running their OLS regression on New Zealand data using 
R&D investment as the dependent variable. 
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variable (BRDMTR), the system of simultaneous equations will not run on the Australian data 
prior to dividend imputation.38 Since the individual tax rate is included in the model primarily 
because of its influence on dividend payment following dividend imputation, and this sample 
represents Australia prior to dividend imputation, I drop the individual tax rate variable (IRATE) 
from the system of equations.39  In Tax Regime I, using Australian data, I find a significant 
negative relationship between R&D expenses and capital expenditures (CAPEX); the relationship 
between R&D expenses and dividend payment (DIVPAY) is in the predicted negative direction 
but insignificant. Thus, the Australian Tax Regime I evidence supports H1a but not H1b.40 
Australian firms operating after the implementation of R&D super-deductibility, but prior 
to dividend imputation’s implementation, compose Tax Regime II. The results in Table 10 also 
contain the relationships between R&D expenses and capital expenditures and between R&D 
expenses and dividend payment during this period. To evaluate them, one must examine the 
coefficients of the variables in Table 10 and their interactions with the dummy for the R&D tax 
incentive of super-deductibility (R&DINCENT). Combining the coefficient of capital 
expenditures (CAPEX = -.0104) with the coefficient for the interaction between the availability 
of R&D super-deductibility and capital expenditures (R&DINCENT*CAPEX = .0103), results in 
a negative coefficient (-.0001) for the relationship between R&D expense and capital 
expenditures. This finding supports H1a in Tax Regime II. In this same setting, a negative, 
significant relationship between R&D expense and dividend payment is not found and thus, H1b 
is not supported.  
                                                 
38 When running a three stage least squares regression on simultaneous equations, Stata automatically drops 
any variables causing multicollinearity issues. 
39 The results of the system of simultaneous equations do not change when instead of dropping the 
individual tax rate (IRATE) from the model, I drop the corporate tax rate (CRATE), nor when I drop both 
the individual tax rate (IRATE) and corporate tax rate (CRATE). 
40 Not finding a significant relationship between R&D investment and dividend payment in Australia is 
consistent with Black et al.’s (2000) finding when running their OLS regression on Australia data using 
R&D investment as the dependent variable. 
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The second hypothesis predicts a positive relationship between R&D expense and the 
before-R&D MTR in both Tax Regimes I and II. As Tables 9 and 10 show, this variable is only 
significant in Tax Regime I for New Zealand firms. Here, firms with higher MTRs tend to invest 
more heavily in R&D despite the absence of a tax incentive for R&D investment. This supports 
H2 in Tax Regime I for New Zealand but not Tax Regime I or II for Australia.  
In conclusion, when investigating the initial relationships between R&D investment and 
dividend payment and between R&D investment and capital investment, the only significant 
relationships are between R&D investment and capital investment in Australian Tax Regimes I 
and II. Further they are negative, suggesting that as Australian firms invest less in capital as they 
invest more in R&D. Again, not finding support for H1a, a negative relationship between R&D 
investment and dividend payout does not threaten the validity of this study or its data. The 
purpose of the first two hypotheses is simply to understand the setting prior to the tax regime 
changes. 
The third hypothesis investigates firms moving from Tax Regime I to Tax Regime II—
Australia before and after the R&D tax incentive. Here the prediction is a weaker or less negative 
relationship between R&D investment and dividend payment after the R&D tax incentive’s 
implementation. Before and after the implementation of super-deductibility, this relationship is 
negative (Table 10). However, since it is insignificant in both cases, the results cannot support 
H3.41 As shown in Table 13, the sample size of Australian firms in Tax Regimes I and II is 192. 
The post-hoc observed power is 0.99, indicating that low power is likely not the reason for a lack 
of significance.   
The fourth and fifth hypotheses investigate actions of dividend-paying firms moving 
from Tax Regime I to Tax Regime III—New Zealand before and after dividend imputation.42 H4 
                                                 
41 The change from Tax Regime I to Tax Regime II involves a change in corporate taxes (via a 150 percent 
R&D deduction), and thus, cannot be used to investigate the dividend policy views.  
42 Hypotheses four and five correspond to hypotheses seven and eight which investigate dividend-paying 
firms moving from Tax Regime II to Tax Regime IV (Australia from July 1988 to June 1993). 
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compares the amounts of dividend payment, capital investment, and R&D investment in Tax 
Regime II with Tax Regime IV, to determine the dominant dividend policy view. H5 investigates 
the change in the relationship between R&D investment and dividend payment when moving 
from Tax Regime II to Tax Regime IV. Using the nonparametric Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test to 
investigate H4a shows that R&D expense deflated by size changed (decreased) significantly (z = 
1.80, p = 0.0714) after dividend imputation.43,44 Running it on capital expenditures, deflated by 
size and dividend payment, deflated by earnings tests H4b and H4c.45 The results do not show a 
significant change in the median of capital expenditures so H4b is not supported. However, they 
do indicate a marginally significant increase in dividend payment (z = -1.25, p = 0.10) after 
dividend imputation, supporting H4c. When New Zealand moved from Tax Regime I to Tax 
Regime III, it also lowered its corporate tax rate. As Table 4, Panel B shows, all of the corporate 
dividend policy views predict that R&D investment could change and that capital expenditures 
should increase after moving from Tax Regime I to Tax Regime III. Further while the double 
taxation view suggests that dividend payment should increase, the other two views also hold that 
it may. Since capital investment did not increase, the results cannot support one corporate 
dividend policy view over another. 
Generating the system of simultaneous equations (12) and (13), using only dividend-
paying, New Zealand firms, investigates the changes in the relationship between R&D investment 
and dividend payment when moving between these two tax regimes.46 The relationship between 
R&D expense and dividend payment in both tax regimes is insignificant. This insignificance does 
not support Thomas et al.’s (2003) idea that dividend imputation increases dividend payment at 
                                                 
43 The R&D expense variable is not deflated when running the system of simultaneous equations since a 
firm size variable is included in the equations as a control variable. 
44 I run the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test because Bartlett’s test for equal variances rejects the null 
hypothesis of equal variances in the deflated R&D expense variable, and thus the parametric t-test would 
not be appropriate. I use a two-tailed test since the hypothesis is non-directional. 
45Again, the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test is used because Bartlett’s test for equal variances rejects the null 
hypothesis of equal variances in the deflated capital expense and dividend payment variables, and thus the 
parametric t-test would not be appropriate. I use a one-tailed test since the direction is predicted.  
46 I cannot use the system of equations generated in Table 9 since it includes both dividend-paying firms 
and non-dividend-paying firms. 
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the expense of R&D investment when an incentive for only dividend payment exists (H5a). This 
insignificance also prevents testing H5b directly by comparing the magnitude of change in the 
coefficients. The system of simultaneous equations does yield three significant variables, the prior 
year’s R&D expense (z = 2.91, p = 0.004), before-R&D MTR (z = 1.64, p = 0.100), and the 
interaction between the imputation credit and the before-R&D MTR (z = -1.89, p = 0.058). When 
New Zealand operates under Tax Regime I, the coefficient for the before-R&D MTR is 23321; in 
Tax Regime III, it is 5900. This implies that for dividend-paying firms in Tax Regime I, where no 
R&D investment or dividend payment incentives exists, the greater the MTR, the greater the 
investment in R&D. However, when in Tax Regime III, firms with high MTRs do not invest as 
much in R&D as they did when in Tax Regime I.  
Since the before-R&D MTR variable and its interactions with dividend imputation are 
significant, running the system of simultaneous equations by MTR could provide additional 
information. Thus the system of simultaneous equations (12) and (13) is run on the New Zealand 
dividend-paying firms after replacing the before-R&D MTR variable with a dummy variable. If a 
firm has a before-R&D MTR value of the highest corporate statutory tax rate, it receives a 
dummy MTR value of one. If the firm’s before-R&D MTR equals either one-half of the corporate 
statutory rate or zero, it receives a dummy MTR value of zero.47 The results of running a three 
stage least squares regression on the system of equations appear in Table 11.  
When the sample is divided by MTR, only the prior year’s R&D expense and interactions 
involving the high-MTR group are significant.48 Dividend imputation does not affect the 
relationships between R&D expense and capital investment or between R&D expense and 
dividend payment in low/mid-MTR, dividend-paying New Zealand firms. This demonstrates that 
the effects of dividend imputation in dividend-paying firms differ according to firm MTRs. In 
                                                 
47Due to the size of the sample, Stata cannot run the set of simultaneous equations if the sample is divided 
into three groups (high, medium, and low-MTRs) instead of two groups (high and medium/low-MTRs) 
because the low-MTR group is too small. 
48 These results do not change when the system of simultaneous equations is run using the mid-MTR group 
instead of the low/mid-MTR group. Again, the low-MTR group alone is too small for Stata to run. 
57 
Tax Regime I, dividend-paying firms with higher MTRs, as compared to firms with lower MTRs, 
invest significantly more in R&D as they pay more dividends (MTR*DIVPAY). However, once 
in Tax Regime III, dividend-paying firms with high MTRs, as compared to firms with lower 
MTRs, invest significantly less in R&D as they pay more in dividends 
(MTR*IMPCRED*DIVPAY).  
This is contrary to Thomas et al.’s prediction that firms operating under Tax Regime I (no 
tax incentives) experience a decrease in the inverse relationship between R&D expense and 
dividend payment when they move to Tax Regime III (tax incentive for dividend payment). 
Further it supports the prediction in hypothesis 5b that dividend-paying firms in Tax Regime III 
display a significantly greater negative relationship between R&D expense and dividend payment 
when they have higher versus lower MTRs. Dividend imputation does not seem to affect firms 
with lower MTRs. This finding reiterates the importance of considering firm MTRs when 
evaluating tax changes and demonstrates that a policy permitting 100 percent deductibility of 
R&D expenses may serve as an R&D incentive for firms with high MTRs. 
The sixth hypothesis investigates corporate dividend policy views by focusing on non-
dividend-paying New Zealand firms operating in Tax Regime I versus Tax Regime III.49 As in 
the forth hypothesis, running the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test on R&D deflated by size and 
dividend payment deflated by earnings and capital investment deflated by size investigates 
hypothesis 6.50 The results on all three of these runs do not indicate significant changes in any of 
the variables and thus cannot support H6. Table 4, Panel B displays the predictions of the 
dividend policy views. All three views predict that capital investment will increase and thus my 
findings in non-dividend-paying, New Zealand firms do not support one view over another.  
                                                 
49 Hypothesis six corresponds to hypothesis nine which investigates non-dividend-paying firms moving 
from Tax Regime II to Tax Regime IV (Australia from July 1988 to June 1993). 
50 I run the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney since Bartlett’s test for equal variances rejects the null hypothesis of 
equal variances. I use a two-tailed test when the hypothesis is non-directional and a one-tailed test when the 
direction is predicted.  
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The seventh and eighth hypotheses compare dividend-paying firms operating under Tax 
Regime II with those operating under Tax Regime IV—Australia before and after the 
implementation of dividend imputation. H7 focuses on changes in investments and dividend 
payments to investigate the corporate dividend policy views; H8 investigates the relationship 
between R&D expense and dividend payment.51 Running the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test on 
R&D and capital investment deflated by size and dividend payment deflated by earnings 
investigates the changes in these variables between the two tax regimes.52 None of these tests 
detect significant changes in the medians of these variables when operating under Tax Regime II 
versus Tax Regime IV. Table 3, Panel D, contains the predictions of the corporate dividend 
policy views.  
The tax irrelevance view predicts no changes in R&D investment, capital investment, or 
dividend payment. According to the tax capitalization view, R&D investment and dividend 
payment may increase. However, it also contends that the capital gains tax which was added 
under Tax Regime IV will decrease the after-tax appreciation shareholders receive when they sell 
their stock—increasing the cost of capital and decreasing capital investment. The double taxation 
view does not provide a prediction for the change since dividend imputation and capital gains 
affect the cost of capital in opposite directions. Thus when comparing the behavior of dividend-
paying firms in Tax Regime II to those in Tax Regime IV, I find support for only the tax 
irrelevance and double taxation views.  
Running the system of simultaneous equations (12) and (13) using only Australian 
dividend-paying firms in operation between July 1985 and June 1993 investigates the relationship 
                                                 
51 Hypotheses seven and eight correspond to hypotheses four and five which investigate dividend-paying 
firms moving from Tax Regime I to Tax Regime III (New Zealand before and after dividend imputation). 
52 I run the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test since Bartlett’s test for equal variances rejects the null hypothesis 
of equal variances, indicating the parametric t-test would not be appropriate. I use a two-tailed test when 
the hypothesis is non-directional and a one-tailed test when it is directional. 
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between R&D investment and dividend payment.53 Table 12 displays the results. Investigating the 
interaction between the availability of dividend imputation and dividend payment 
(IMPCRED*DIVPAY), reveals that dividend-paying firms exhibit a stronger (more negative) 
relationship between R&D expense and dividend payment when operating under Tax Regime IV 
(Australia, after super-deductibility and dividend imputation) than under Tax Regime II 
(Australia, after super-deductibility and before dividend imputation). This supports H8a and 
suggests that after dividend imputation, when firms pay dividends, they decrease their R&D 
investment by a larger amount than they did prior to dividend imputation.  
Running the system of simultaneous equations (12) and (13) on the Australian dividend-
paying firms investigates the differences Australian dividend-paying firms may exhibit due to 
their MTRs. A dummy variable for before-R&D MTR is included. If a firm has a before-R&D 
expense value of the highest corporate statutory tax rate, it receives a dummy value of one. If the 
firm’s before-R&D MTR equals either one-half of the corporate statutory rate or zero, it receives 
a dummy value of zero.54 Unfortunately Stata cannot run this system of equations due to the high 
collinearity between the interaction of the dummy variable indicating a high MTR and dividend 
payment (MTR*DIVPAY) and the interaction of the existence of dividend imputation and 
dividend payment (IMPCRED*DIVPAY).55 However, the multicollinearity between these 
variables implies that it is the firms with the high-MTRs driving the negative relationship 
between the interaction of the existence of dividend imputation and dividend payment 
(IMPCRED*DIVPAY) in Table 12. Further, this implies that firms with higher marginal tax rates 
experience a stronger (more negative) relationship when both tax incentives are available, 
supporting H8b.  
                                                 
53 I cannot use the system of equations generated in Table 10 since it includes both Australian dividend-
paying and non-dividend-paying firms in operation between July 1981 and June 1987. 
54Due to the size of the sample, Stata cannot run the set of simultaneous equations if the sample is divided 
into three groups (high, medium, low) instead of two groups (high and medium/low). 
55 When running a three stage least squares regression on simultaneous equations, Stata automatically drops 
any variables causing multicollinearity issues. 
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The ninth hypothesis compares non-dividend-paying firms operating under Tax Regime 
II with non-dividend-paying firms operating under Tax Regime IV—Australia before and after 
the implementation of dividend imputation.56 Running the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test on R&D 
and capital investment, deflated by size and on dividend payment deflated by earnings provides 
dividend policy view evidence in this setting.57 The medians of these variables when operating 
under Tax Regime II versus Tax Regime IV do not change significantly and thus do not support 
hypothesis 9. Table 4, Panel D, contains the predictions of the corporate dividend policy views.  
The tax capitalization and double taxation views both contend that it is plausible for these 
non-dividend-paying firms to begin paying dividends. None of my non-dividend-paying firms 
began paying dividends following dividend imputation’s implementation. The lack of companies 
beginning to pay dividend after dividend imputation may initially seem surprising given the 
recent studies of U.S. companies after an individual dividend tax rate decrease (Blouin et al. 
2004, Treasury Office of Economic Policy 2003). However, these studies also find that share 
repurchases, which were not common in New Zealand or Australia during my sample period, 
decreased.58 
H10 investigates the changes in R&D expenses, capital expenditures, and dividend 
payment to see if they vary depending on the firms’ MTRs. This is tested by using the sample of 
non-dividend-paying Australian tax firms with a dummy variable created for the MTR to divide 
the sample into two MTR groups as in the test for H8. Neither group, low/mid-MTR or high-
MTR show significant changes. This finding does not support H10a, H10b or H10c.  
                                                 
56 Hypothesis nine corresponds to hypothesis six which investigates non-dividend-paying firms moving 
from Tax Regime I to Tax Regime III (New Zealand before and after dividend imputation). 
57 I run the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test since Bartlett’s test for equal variances rejects the null hypothesis 
of equal variances, indicating the parametric t-test is not appropriate. When the hypothesis is non-
directional, I use a two-tailed test and when it is directional, I use a one-tailed test. 
58 In the United States, share repurchases could serve as an alternative use of corporate funds. A decrease in 
share repurchases could increase the funds available for dividend payments, leading to the increased 
dividend payments observed in these studies. 
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Tables 13 through 15 contain summaries of the hypotheses and findings. Table 13 
contains the predictions and results of the first two hypotheses which investigate the relationships 
among R&D investment and capital expenditures and among R&D investment and dividend 
payment prior to each of the tax regime changes. The results of investigating the relationship 
between R&D investment and dividend payment when the tax regime changes (hypotheses 3, 5, 
and 8) are in Table 14. Table 15 shows the results of hypotheses 4, 6, 7, and 9 which investigate 
the changes in tax regimes for evidence on the corporate dividend policy views.   
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Chapter VIII 
Conclusions and Implications 
Conclusions 
As shown in Table 13, in both dividend and non-dividend-paying firms, the relationship 
between R&D expense and dividend payment is negative but insignificant in Tax Regime I and 
Tax Regime II. The relationship between R&D expenses and capital investment is negative for 
both Australian Tax Regime I and II. This implies that as Australian firms invest more in capital, 
they invest less in R&D. Also summarized in Table 13, a positive relationship between R&D 
expense and the before-R&D MTR exists in New Zealand’s Tax Regime I. This implies that in 
this setting, firms invest more in R&D when they have higher MTRs. Again firms with higher 
MTRs, receive greater benefit from any R&D expense deduction than firms with lower MTRs. 
As shown in Table 14, Panel A, when Australia moves from Tax Regime I to Tax 
Regime II (before and after R&D super-deductibility), the change in the relationship between 
R&D expenses and dividend payment is not significant. When New Zealand moves from Tax 
Regime I to Tax Regime III, the relationship between R&D expenses and dividend payment is not 
significant for dividend-paying firms before or after dividend imputation (Table 14, Panel B). 
Since one would most likely find the effect of dividend imputation on the relationship between 
R&D investment and dividend payment in firms that pay dividends, this finding suggests that 
dividend imputation does not have an effect on it. 
However, as summarized in Table 14, Panel C, when these New Zealand firms are 
separated by MTR, after dividend imputation’s implementation, dividend-paying firms with 
higher MTRs exhibit a significantly stronger (more negative) relationship between R&D expense 
and dividend payment than dividend-paying firms with lower MTRs. Thus the evidence suggests 
that as dividend-paying firms with higher MTRs move from Tax Regime I to Tax Regime III, the 
amount they invest in R&D as they pay dividends will decrease. The move between these two tax 
regimes does not appear to impact dividend-paying firms with lower MTRs. This finding also 
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stresses the importance of considering firms’ abilities to use tax credits and that 100 percent 
deductibility for R&D expenses may serve as an R&D tax incentive for firms with high MTRs. 
 In dividend-paying firms operating under Tax Regime II versus Tax Regime IV, a 
stronger (more negative) relationship between R&D expense and dividend payment exists when 
operating under Tax Regime IV. This supports the theory that as a firm moves from Tax Regime 
II, where only an R&D tax incentive exists, to Tax Regime IV, where tax incentives for both 
R&D and dividend payment exist, the inverse relationship between a firm’s R&D investment and 
dividend payment increases. I cannot directly test to see if this group of firms exhibits differences 
in the relationship between R&D expense and dividend payment according to their MTRs, 
because of multicollinearity between the high-MTR firms and dividend payment and between the 
existence of dividend imputation and dividend payment. However, this multicollinearity implies 
that the results in Table 12 and Panel D of Table 14 are driven by firms with high MTRs. If so, 
then high-MTR firms in Tax Regime IV do display a greater increase in the negativity of the 
relationship between R&D expense and dividend payment. This again demonstrates the 
importance of considering firms’ tax status when predicting outcomes of changes in tax regimes.  
This paper also provides insight into the dividend tax puzzle; the results of the dividend 
policy view hypotheses are summarized in Table 15. When investigating the results of a tax 
regime simultaneously ceasing to tax dividends at the shareholder-level and lowering corporate 
tax rates, I do not find support for any of the current corporate dividend policy views (Table 15, 
Panel A). I find that in dividend-paying firms, R&D investment and dividend payment change 
significantly. As shown in Table 3, Panel B, all three of the corporate dividend policy views 
predict an increase in capital investment. Since I do not find this, I cannot support one view over 
another in this setting. When I investigate non-dividend-paying firms operation under these same 
changes (Table 15, Panel B), I do not find a change in R&D investment, capital investment, nor 
dividend payment and again cannot support one view over another. 
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However, when investigating the results of a tax regime simultaneously ceasing to tax 
dividends and implementing a capital gains tax (Table 15, Panel C), I find support for the tax 
irrelevance and double taxation views in dividend-paying firms. I do not find the significant 
decrease in capital investment predicted by the tax capitalization view. In non-dividend-paying 
firms moving from Tax Regime II to Tax Regime IV, I do not find significant changes in R&D 
investment, capital investment, or dividend payment. All of the dividend policy views predict that 
this is a plausible outcome.  
 Like many studies using Australian and New Zealand data, this paper is limited by the 
sample size and thus lower power. The number of companies operating in these countries is small 
in comparison with the United States. Further, in an effort to be able to conclude that the tax 
changes of the respective country was a driving force, companies needed to be considered 
domestic to be included in the sample.59 In addition, only companies in existence for a minimum 
of three consecutive years were included in the sample. This was because data from the prior two 
years were needed to calculate the average cash from financing variable (AVGFCF).  As a result 
data from as early as 1980 was needed and many of the financial databases do not carry 
information that far back for Australia and New Zealand. Many efforts to increase the number of 
companies were made, including hand-collecting data from financial statements housed in 
Western Australia. Ideally, only companies in existence throughout the entire sample period 
would have been included. However, such a requirement would have further reduced the sample 
size. 
Implications  
This paper contributes to two areas of the literature—(1) the relationship between tax 
incentives for R&D investment and dividend payment and (2) the dividend tax views. It provides 
new evidence on the relationship between tax incentives for R&D investment and dividend 
                                                 
59 This paper defines domestic firms as those with (1) less than 50 percent of their total sales due to foreign 
sales, (2) less than 50 percent of their total assets located abroad, and (3) less than 50 percent of their total 
income due to foreign income. 
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payment. I demonstrate that Thomas et al.’s (2003) prediction that the tension between R&D 
investment and dividend payment decreases when a country previously not offering tax incentives 
for R&D investment or dividend payout, implements one, does not hold in Australia or New 
Zealand.60 Further I find just the opposite for New Zealand dividend-paying firms with higher 
MTRs. They behave in the manner predicted for firms moving from a tax regime offering a tax 
incentive for R&D investment to a tax regime offering tax incentives for both R&D investment 
and dividend payment. This finding demonstrates that the relationship between tax incentives for 
R&D investment and dividend payment varies according to firm MTRs and typical dividend 
payment policies. It also reiterates the importance of considering firms’ abilities to use R&D tax 
incentives. The results of this paper provide evidence that 100 percent deductibility for R&D 
expenses serves as an R&D tax incentive for firms with higher MTRs. This implies that 
researchers evaluating the success of an explicit R&D tax incentive should consider the benefit 
firms were previously receiving from the 100 percent deductibility of R&D.   
I also demonstrate that Thomas et al.’s (2003) prediction that the tension between R&D 
investment and dividend payment increases when a country previously offering only a tax 
incentives for R&D investment, offers one for both R&D investment and dividend payment, 
holds in Australian, dividend-paying firms. Further, this result appears to be driven by firms with 
high MTRs. This, coupled with the finding in New Zealand, demonstrates the importance of 
considering the MTRs of firms when contemplating the effects a shareholder-level dividend tax 
decrease will have on R&D investment.   
This paper also provides new insight into the corporate dividend policy views. It finds 
support for the double taxation and tax irrelevance views in dividend-paying firms operating in a 
tax regime with dividend imputation and capital gains taxes. This paper also documents 
significant decreases in R&D investment when a tax regime provides dividend implementation 
                                                 
60 The effects of moving from no incentives to one incentive were seen by investigating Australia moving 
from Tax Regime I to Tax Regime II and New Zealand moving from Tax Regime I to Tax Regime III. 
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but do not provide explicit incentives for R&D. This highlights a void in the current corporate 
dividend policy views and shows the need for the inclusion of R&D investment. Traditionally 
these views have only considered capital investment, not R&D investment. The negative 
relationships between R&D expenses and capital expenditures documented in this paper 
demonstrate that R&D and capital investments often move in opposite directions and that tax 
changes in shareholder-level dividend taxes affect the investment in R&D.  
Both managers and policymakers should also find this paper of interest. It documents that 
decreases in shareholder-level dividend taxes (through dividend imputation) result in changes in 
the negative relationship between dividend payment and R&D investment. Contingent on the 
R&D tax incentive in place, changes in shareholder-level dividend taxes may place pressure on 
firms to increase the amount of dividends paid while decreasing the amount of R&D investment. 
This study found that in both New Zealand and Australia, investment in R&D decreased after the 
implementation of dividend imputation.61 Further, it found that the effects of shareholder-level 
dividend tax decreases vary according to the R&D tax incentive in place, the dividend policy of 
the firm, and the MTR of the firm. 
Decreases in investment in R&D could have a negative effect on economic growth since 
research shows that domestic R&D spending is linked to the rate of innovation and the ability to 
learn from others (Cameron 1996, Salter and Martin 2001). While on the surface, the payment of 
dividends and R&D investment may seem unrelated, the results of this paper demonstrate this is 
not true. Therefore when a decrease in shareholder-level dividend taxes designed to stimulate 
economic growth is implemented, economic growth may be negated by a decrease in R&D 
investment. Simply put, a decrease in shareholder-level dividend taxes serves as an incentive for 
corporations to pay dividends. Hence President Bush’s statement regarding the Job and Growth 
Tax Relief Act of 2003, “The bill allows for dividend income to be taxed at a lower rate. This will 
encourage more companies to pay dividends.” However, as explained in this paper, company cash 
                                                 
61 In New Zealand this decrease was statistically significant (hypothesis 4a). 
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flow is often limited and the funds to pay increased dividends must come from somewhere. In 
New Zealand and Australia, much of the increased dividend funding appears to have come from 
R&D investment. Thus, if a country decides to decrease shareholder-level dividend taxes and the 
country values investment in R&D, it may need to consider simultaneously increasing the R&D 
investment incentive. 
More research is needed before the conclusions from this paper can be generalized to 
countries such as the United States. This is due primarily to the fact that unlike New Zealand and 
Australia during this paper’s sample period, the United States permits share repurchases. When a 
country allowing share repurchases, implements a dividend payment incentive, funding for 
increased dividend payments may be drawn from funds previously used for share repurchases 
instead of from R&D investment funds. Therefore, future study in countries permitting share 
repurchases is needed before we can generalize the results of this paper to the United States.   
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Table 1 
Summary of Australian and New Zealand Tax Changes  
 
 
Panel A: Tax Changes in Australia (effective July 1985) 
 
 Prior to the Tax Change After the Tax Change 
R&D Investment Immediate deduction for  
100 percent of investment 
Immediate deduction for  
150 percent of investment  
above $20,000 AUS 
 
Dividends Received 
 
Taxed fully at shareholder 
level 
 
Same 
 
Capital Gains Realized 
 
Taxed at individual rates only 
if held for less than 12 
months; otherwise, no tax 
applied 
 
Same  
 
 
Panel B: Tax Changes in Australia (effective July 1987) 
 
 Prior to the Tax Change After the Tax Change 
 
R&D Investment 
 
Immediate deduction for  
150 percent of investment 
above $20,000 AUS 
 
Same 
 
Dividends Received 
 
Taxed fully at shareholder 
level 
Credit for the portion of the 
dividend on which the 
corporation had already paid 
tax (“franked dividend”) 
 
Capital Gains Realized 
 
Taxed at individual rates only 
if held for less than 12 
months; otherwise, no tax 
applied 
 
Taxed at the individual tax 
rate on the difference between 
the consideration received and 
the indexed cost base  
 
 
Panel C: Tax Changes in New Zealand (effective April 1988) 
 
 Prior to the Tax Change After the Tax Change 
 
R&D Investment 
 
Immediate deduction for  
100 percent of investment 
 
Same 
 
Dividends Received 
 
Taxed fully at shareholder 
level 
Credit for the portion of the 
dividend on which the 
corporation had already paid 
tax  
 
Top Corporate Tax Rate 
 
48 percent 
 
33 percent 
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Table 2 
Tax Regimes 
 
 Time  
Period 
R&D 
Investment 
Incentive 
Dividend 
Payment 
Incentive 
 
Tax Regime I 
 
 
Australia prior to July 1985 
New Zealand prior to April 1988 
 
 
No 
 
No 
 
Tax Regime II 
 
 
Australia from July 1985 to June 1987 
 
Yes 
 
No 
 
Tax Regime III 
 
 
New Zealand after March 1988 
 
No 
 
Yes 
 
Tax Regime IV 
 
 
Australia after June 1987 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
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Table 3 
Tax Change Implications for Firms Typically Paying Dividends  
 
Panel A: Given No Explicit Incentive for R&D Investment, the Effect of a Dividend  
  Imputation Credit *  
  
R&D 
Investment
 
Capital 
Investment
 
Dividend 
Payment 
Tax Irrelevance No Change No Change No Change 
Tax Capitalization No Change No Change No Change 
Double Taxation --------- Increase Increase 
 
 
Panel B: Given No Explicit Incentive for R&D Investment, the Effect of a Decrease in  
  Corporate Tax Rates* 
  
R&D 
Investment
 
Capital 
Investment
 
Dividend 
Payment 
Tax Irrelevance --------- Increase --------- 
Tax Capitalization --------- Increase --------- 
Double Taxation --------- Increase Increase 
 
Panel C: Given an Explicit Incentive for R&D Investment, the Effect of a Dividend  
  Imputation Credit**  
  
R&D 
Investment
 
Capital 
Investment
 
Dividend 
Payment 
Tax Irrelevance No Change No Change No Change 
Tax Capitalization No Change No Change No Change 
Double Taxation --------- Increase Increase 
 
 
Panel D: Given a Dividend Imputation Credit and an Explicit Incentive for Investment in  
  R&D, the Effect of Capital Gains Tax on Firms** 
  
R&D 
Investment
 
Capital 
Investment
 
Dividend 
Payment 
Tax Irrelevance No Change No Change No Change 
Tax Capitalization --------- Decrease --------- 
Double Taxation --------- --------- --------- 
 
--------- Indicates no prediction. According to the dividend policy view, the variable could    
increase, decrease, or remain the same. 
* Panel B portrays the effect of moving from Tax Regime I to Tax Regime III and is tested in 
hypothesis 4.  
**Panel D portrays the effect of moving from Tax Regime II to Tax Regime IV and is tested in 
hypothesis 7. 
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Table 4 
Tax Change Implications for Firms Not Typically Paying Dividends  
 
Panel A: Given No Explicit Incentive for R&D Investment, the Effect of a Dividend  
  Imputation Credit* 
  
R&D 
Investment
 
Capital 
Investment
 
Dividend 
Payment 
Tax Irrelevance No Change No Change No Change 
Tax Capitalization No Change No Change No Change 
Double Taxation No Change No Change No Change 
 
 
Panel B: Given a Dividend Imputation Credit and No Explicit Incentive for R&D  
Investment, the Effect of a Decrease in Corporate Tax Rates* 
  
R&D 
Investment
 
Capital 
Investment
 
Dividend 
Payment 
Tax Irrelevance --------- Increase No Change 
Tax Capitalization --------- Increase No Change  
Double Taxation --------- Increase No Change  
 
Panel C: Given an Explicit Incentive for R&D Investment, the Effect of a Dividend  
  Imputation Credit ** 
  
R&D 
Investment
 
Capital 
Investment
 
Dividend 
Payment 
Tax Irrelevance No Change No Change No Change 
Tax Capitalization No Change No Change No Change 
Double Taxation No Change No Change No Change 
 
Panel D: Given a Dividend Imputation Credit and an Explicit Incentive for Investment in  
  R&D, the Effect of Lower Capital Gains Tax on Firms** 
  
R&D 
Investment
 
Capital 
Investment
 
Dividend 
Payment 
Tax Irrelevance No Change No Change No Change 
Tax Capitalization --------- --------- --------- 
Double Taxation --------- --------- --------- 
 
--------- Indicates no prediction. According to the dividend policy view, the variable could    
increase, decrease, or remain the same. 
** Panel B portrays the effect of moving from Tax Regime I to Tax Regime III and is tested in 
hypothesis 6.  
**Panel D portrays the effect of moving from Tax Regime II to Tax Regime IV and is tested in 
hypothesis 9. 
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Table 5 
Descriptive Statistics of Regression Variables—Means (Medians)  
(in thousands of dollars) 
 
Variable  
New Zealand  
n = 72 
Australia  
n = 623 
RDX  
    R&D expense  
1006 
(.7) 
3432 
(0) 
BRDMTR** 
    Trichotomous variable on before-R&D MTR 
.25* 
(.33) 
.33* 
(.39) 
DIVPAY 
    Dividend payment 
9435* 
(4376) 
34240* 
(6944) 
AVGOPCF  
    Average operating cash flows 
29571* 
(14491) 
94857* 
(26257) 
AVGFCF  
    Average financing cash flows 
51122 
(-454) 
1134 
(-697.5) 
CAPEX  
    Capital Expenditures 
27796* 
(4777) 
85813* 
(16201) 
DEBT  
    Beginning-of-the-year debt-to-assets ratio 
.48 
(.48) 
.50 
(.52) 
EBTR 
    Earnings before taxes and R&D expense 
21291 
(12191) 
89541 
(23741) 
LRDX 
    Lagged R&D expense 
823 
(1.15) 
3061 
(0) 
SIZE  
    Log of total sales 
11.97* 
(12) 
12.56* 
(12.55) 
GPD 
    Gross Domestic Product 
69212* 
(73152) 
358470* 
(382497) 
B/M  
    Book-to-Market ratio 
1.34 
(1.01) 
1.49 
(1.26) 
CRATE  
    Statutory corporate tax rate 
.36* 
(.33) 
.42* 
(.39) 
IRATE  
    Statutory individual tax rate  
.40* 
(.33) 
.51* 
(.49) 
LDIVPAY  
    Lagged dividend payment 
7677* 
(3550) 
29892* 
(6552) 
EGROW  
    Growth in earnings 
.95 
(.09) 
493.87 
(.14) 
CAPRET  
    Return provided through price appreciation 
1.34 
(1.01) 
1.49 
(1.26) 
*Variables with significant differences in the mean. 
** Before-R&D marginal tax rate calculated by adding R&D expense to the taxable income and then 
determining Shelvin’s (1990) trichotomous variable; Shelvin’s (1990) trichotomous variable equals the top 
statutory rate if the corporation has before-R&D taxable income and no NOL carryforward, one-half of this 
rate if the corporation has negative before-R&D taxable income or an NOL carryforward but not both, and 
zero if the firm has negative before-R&D taxable income and an NOL carryforward; 
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Table 9 
Results for Simultaneous Regression Estimation in New Zealand Firms 
Moving from Tax Regime I to Tax Regime III  
 
Variable 
RDX 
R&D 
Expense 
DIVPAY 
Dividend 
payment 
BRDMTR 
     Before R&D marginal tax rate 
12284 
(2.50)** 
5000 
(0.47) 
DIVPAY 
    Dividend payment 
-.0525 
(-0.01) 
 
AVGOPCF  
    Average operating cash flows 
-.0021 
(-0.07) 
.0847 
(1.99) 
AVGFCF  
    Average financing cash flows 
-.0004 
(-0.18) 
-.0022 
(-0.32) 
CAPEX  
    Capital Expenditures 
-.0327 
(-0.03) 
.1399 
(5.07)*** 
DEBT  
    Beginning-of-the-year debt-to-assets ratio 
920 
(0.18) 
1505 
(0.32) 
EBTR 
    Earnings before taxes and R&D expense 
.0096 
(0.10) 
.0163 
(0.55) 
LRDX 
    Lagged R&D expense 
.9878 
(3.28)*** 
 
SIZE  
    Log of total sales 
-32.16 
(-0.18) 
458 
(0.63) 
GDP 
    Gross Domestic Product 
-.0222 
(-0.04) 
 
B/M  
    Book-to-Market ratio 
100 
(0.08) 
 
CRATE  
    Statutory corporate tax rate 
4065 
(0.47) 
-175 
(-0.01) 
IRATE  
    Statutory individual tax rate  
-4852 
(-0.11) 
-18283 
(-0.68) 
IMPCRED 
    Dummy measure equal to 1 if dividend imputation exists 
2541 
(0.22) 
-3958 
(-0.63) 
IMPCRED*BRDMTR 
    Interaction between dividend imputation and before-R&D MTR 
-10183 
(-1.86)* 
 
IMPCRED*DIVPAY 
    Interaction between dividend imputation and dividend payment 
.0119 
(0.00) 
 
IMPCRED*CAPEX 
    Interaction between dividend imputation and capital expenditures 
.0404 
(0.04) 
 
RDX 
    R&D Expense 
 -.5224 
(-0.66) 
LDIVPAY  
    Lagged dividend payment 
 .0566 
(0.46) 
EGROW  
    Growth in earnings 
 385 
(2.05)*** 
CAPRET  
    Return provided through price appreciation 
 100 
(0.10) 
z-statistics are in parentheses. 
*,**,*** Denote 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent significance levels, respectively.  
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Table 10 
Results for Simultaneous Regression Estimation in Australian Firms 
Moving from Tax Regime I to Tax Regime II 
Variable R&D 
Expense 
Dividend 
payment 
BRDMTR 
     Before R&D marginal tax rate 
-848 
(-0.79) 
1976 
(0.29) 
DIVPAY 
    Dividend payment 
-.0059 
(-0.13) 
 
AVGOPCF  
    Average operating cash flows 
.0152 
(3.70)*** 
.1030 
(2.56)** 
AVGFCF  
    Average financing cash flows 
-.0006 
(-1.34) 
-.0079 
(-1.96) 
CAPEX  
    Capital Expenditures 
-.0104 
(-2.54)** 
.2036 
(3.03)*** 
DEBT  
    Beginning-of-the-year debt-to-assets ratio 
-895 
(-1.17) 
-12066 
(-1.88)* 
EBTR 
    Earnings before taxes and R&D expense 
-.0048 
(-1.00) 
.0879 
(2.95)*** 
LRDX 
    Lagged R&D expense 
1.14 
(50.53)*** 
 
SIZE  
    Log of total sales 
43.77 
(0.43) 
801 
(0.89) 
GDP 
    Gross Domestic Product 
-.0008 
(-0.14) 
 
B/M  
    Book-to-Market ratio 
10.40 
(0.15) 
 
CRATE  
    Statutory corporate tax rate 
5214 
(0.46) 
-9501 
(-0.10) 
R&DINCENT 
    Dummy measure equal to 1 if super-deductibility exists 
-863 
(-1.37) 
549 
(0.22) 
R&DINCENT*BRDMTR 
    Interaction between super-deductibility and before-R&D MTR 
1222 
(0.81) 
 
R&DINCENT*DIVPAY 
    Interaction between super-deductibility and dividend payment 
-.0095 
(-0.28) 
 
R&DINCENT*CAPEX 
    Interaction between super-deductibility and capital expenditures 
.0103 
(2.42)** 
 
RDX 
    R&D Expense 
 -.5794 
(-4.10)*** 
LDIVPAY  
    Lagged dividend payment 
 .2517 
(5.26)*** 
EGROW  
    Growth in earnings 
 -1.21 
(-1.61)* 
CAPRET  
    Return provided through price appreciation 
 520 
(0.75) 
z-statistics are in parentheses. 
*,**,*** Denote 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent significance levels, respectively. 
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Table 11 
Results for Simultaneous Regression Estimation in New Zealand Dividend-Paying  
Firms Moving from Tax Regime I to Tax Regime III, Separated by MTR 
Variable R&D 
Expense 
Dividend 
payment 
DIVPAY 
    Dividend payment 
.4648 
(0.61) 
 
AVGOPCF  
    Average operating cash flows 
-.0144 
(-1.40) 
.0196 
(0.40) 
AVGFCF  
    Average financing cash flows 
-.0011 
(-0.69) 
-.0123 
(-1.75)* 
CAPEX  
    Capital Expenditures 
-0922 
(-0.70) 
.2031 
(6.48)*** 
DEBT  
    Beginning-of-the-year debt-to-assets ratio 
-2002 
(-0.92) 
7442 
(1.47) 
EBTR 
    Earnings before taxes and R&D expense 
.0027 
(0.09) 
.0617 
(1.79)* 
LRDX 
    Lagged R&D expense 
.9184 
(3.16)*** 
 
SIZE  
    Log of total sales 
-127 
(-0.32) 
-1430 
(-1.04) 
GDP 
    Gross Domestic Product 
-.1909 
(-0.89) 
 
B/M  
    Book-to-Market ratio 
164 
(0.41) 
 
CRATE  
    Statutory corporate tax rate 
658 
(0.07) 
15903 
(0.49) 
IRATE  
    Statutory individual tax rate  
-10910 
(-1.00) 
-38366 
(-1.22) 
IMPCRED 
    Dummy measure equal to 1 if dividend imputation exists 
5657 
(0.66) 
-2836 
(-0.38) 
MTR 
    Dummy measure equal to 1 if before-R&D MTR is highest corporate tax rate 
-866 
(-0.41) 
-2279 
(-0.78) 
IMPCRED*MTR 
    Interaction between dividend imputation and MTR 
651 
(0.28) 
 
IMPCRED*DIVPAY 
    Interaction between dividend imputation and dividend payment 
-.4001 
(-0.55) 
 
IMPCRED*CAPEX 
    Interaction between dividend imputation and capital expenditures 
.0880 
(0.64) 
 
MTR*DIVPAY 
    Interaction between MTR and dividend payment 
2.85 
(2.65)*** 
 
MTR*CAPEX 
    Interaction between MTR and capital expenditures 
-.7672 
(-2.17)** 
 
MTR*IMPCRED*DIVPAY 
    Interaction among MTR, dividend imputation, and dividend payment  
-2.72 
(-2.71)*** 
 
MTR*IMPCRED*CAPEX  
    Interaction among MTR, dividend imputation, and capital expenditures
.7447 
(2.14)** 
 
RDX 
    R&D Expense 
 .9694 
(1.27) 
LDIVPAY  
    Lagged dividend payment 
 .2451 
(1.81)* 
EGROW  
    Growth in earnings 
 608 
(3.14)*** 
CAPRET  
    Return provided through price appreciation 
 492 
(0.44) 
z-statistics are in parentheses; *,**,*** Denote 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent significance levels, respectively. 
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Table 12 
Results for Simultaneous Regression Estimation in Australian Dividend-Paying Firms  
Moving from Tax Regime II to Tax Regime IV 
 
Variable 
R&D 
Expense 
Dividend 
payment 
BRDMTR 
     Before R&D marginal tax rate 
-3738 
(-0.71) 
-30405 
(-2.07)** 
DIVPAY 
    Dividend payment 
.1303 
(1.59) 
 
AVGOPCF  
    Average operating cash flows 
.0104 
(2.04)** 
.1140 
(4.31)*** 
AVGFCF  
    Average financing cash flows 
-.0004 
(-2.08)** 
.0011 
(0.82) 
CAPEX  
    Capital Expenditures 
-.0089 
(-1.59) 
-.0133 
(-1.20) 
DEBT  
    Beginning-of-the-year debt-to-assets ratio 
-203 
(-0.14) 
10432 
(1.17) 
EBTR 
    Earnings before taxes and R&D expense 
-.0002 
(-0.10) 
.0635 
(4.76)*** 
LRDX 
    Lagged R&D expense 
.9291 
(30.94)*** 
 
SIZE  
    Log of total sales 
-216 
(-0.87) 
48.27 
(0.03) 
GDP 
    Gross Domestic Product 
.1205 
(2.58)*** 
 
B/M  
    Book-to-Market ratio 
-198 
(-0.83) 
 
CRATE  
    Statutory corporate tax rate 
51980 
(2.31)** 
-11882 
(-0.30) 
IRATE  
    Statutory individual tax rate  
218567 
(2.71)*** 
332387 
(2.14)** 
IMPCRED 
    Dummy measure equal to 1 if dividend imputation exists 
14196 
(2.55)** 
34223 
(2.18)** 
IMPCRED*BRDMTR 
    Interaction between dividend imputation and before-R&D MTR 
2841 
(0.48) 
 
IMPCRED*DIVPAY 
    Interaction between dividend imputation and dividend payment 
-.1487 
(-1.93)** 
 
IMPCRED*CAPEX 
    Interaction between dividend imputation and capital expenditures 
.0140 
(1.91)* 
 
RDX 
    R&D Expense 
 -.8821 
(-4.89)*** 
LDIVPAY  
    Lagged dividend payment 
 .7249 
(19.77)*** 
EGROW  
    Growth in earnings 
 -1.04 
(-3.16)*** 
CAPRET  
    Return provided through price appreciation 
 426 
(0.28) 
z-statistics are in parentheses. 
*,**,*** Denote 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent significance levels, respectively. 
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 Table 13 
Initial Relationships in Tax Regimes I and II  
 
 
Tax Regime I 
New Zealand Firms Prior to April 1988 
 
  
Relationship Between 
Sample 
Size 
Statistical 
Test 
Predicted 
Sign 
 
Finding 
H1a R&D Investment and 
Capital Investment 
16 Simultaneous 
Regression 
- Insignificant 
H1b R&D Investment and 
Dividend Payment 
16 Simultaneous 
Regression 
- Insignificant 
H2 R&D Investment and 
Before-R&D MTR 
16 Simultaneous 
Regression 
+ + 
 
Tax Regime I 
Australian Firms Prior to June 1985 
 
  
Relationship Between 
Sample 
Size 
Statistical  
Test 
Predicted 
Sign 
 
Finding 
H1a R&D Investment and 
Capital Investment 
106 Simultaneous 
Regression 
- - 
H1b R&D Investment and 
Dividend Payment 
106 Simultaneous 
Regression 
- Insignificant 
H2 R&D Investment and 
Before-R&D MTR 
106 Simultaneous 
Regression 
+ Insignificant 
 
Tax Regime II 
Australian Firms from July 1985 to June 1987 
 
  
Relationship Between 
Sample 
Size 
Statistical 
Test 
Predicted 
Sign 
 
Finding 
H1a R&D Investment and 
Capital Investment 
86 
 
Simultaneous 
Regression 
- - 
H1b R&D Investment and 
Dividend Payment 
86 Simultaneous 
Regression 
- Insignificant 
H2 R&D Investment and 
Before-R&D MTR 
86 Simultaneous 
Regression 
+ Insignificant 
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 Table 14 
Changes in the Relationship between R&D Investment and  
Dividend Payment when Moving Tax Regimes 
 
 
Panel A: Dividend-Paying Firms Moving from Tax Regime I to Tax Regime II 
  
Relationship between 
 
Prediction 
 
Finding 
H3 R&D Investment and 
Dividend Payment 
Weaker Relationship Insignificant 
 
 
 
Panel B: Dividend-Paying Firms Moving from Tax Regime I to Tax Regime III 
  
Relationship between 
 
Prediction 
 
Finding 
H5a R&D Investment and 
Dividend Payment 
Weaker Relationship Insignificant 
 
 
Panel C: Dividend-Paying Firms Moving from Tax Regime I to Tax Regime III, Separated  
                by MTR 
  
Relationship between 
 
Prediction 
 
Finding 
   High 
MTRs 
Low/Mid 
MTRs 
H5b R&D Investment and 
Dividend Payment 
Weakening of Relationship Is 
Greater in Low/Mid-MTRs 
Negativity 
Increases 
Insignificant
 
 
Panel D: Dividend-Paying Firms Moving from Tax Regime II to Tax Regime IV 
  
Relationship between 
 
Prediction 
 
Finding 
H8a R&D Investment and 
Dividend Payment 
Stronger  
Relationship 
Stronger 
 Relationship 
 
 
Panel E: Dividend-Paying Firms Moving from Tax Regime II to Tax Regime IV, Separated  
                by MTR 
 
 
 
Relationship between 
 
Prediction 
 
Finding** 
H8b R&D Investment and 
Dividend Payment 
Increase in the Strength of the 
Relationship is Greater in High-
MTRs 
Cannot Test Directly Due 
to Multi-Collinearity 
 
 
** The high collinearity between the interaction of dividend imputation and dividend payment 
and the interaction of the high-MTR group and dividend payment implies that the high-MTR 
group drives the result in H8a. H8a finds a stronger relationship between R&D expense and 
dividend payment after dividend imputation. If this finding is driven by the high-MTR group, it 
supports H8b. 
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Table 15 
Changes in R&D Investment, Capital Investment, and Dividend Payment 
When Moving Tax Regimes 
 
 
Panel A: Dividend-Paying Firms Moving from Tax Regime I to Tax Regime III 
 
 
 
Change in 
 
Prediction 
 
Finding 
H4a R&D Investment Change Decrease 
H4b Capital Investment Increase Insignificant 
H4c Dividend Payment Increase Increase 
 
 
Panel B: Non-Dividend-Paying Firms Moving from Tax Regime I to Tax Regime III 
 
 
 
Change in 
 
Prediction 
 
Finding 
H6a R&D Investment Change Insignificant 
H6b Capital Investment Increase Insignificant 
H6c Dividend Payment Change Insignificant 
 
 
Panel C: Dividend-Paying Firms Moving from Tax Regime II to Tax Regime IV 
 
 
 
Change in 
 
Prediction 
 
Finding 
H7a R&D Investment Change Insignificant 
H7b Capital Investment Increase Insignificant 
H7c Dividend Payment Increase Insignificant 
 
 
Panel D: Non-Dividend-Paying Firms Moving from Tax Regime II to Tax Regime IV 
 
 
 
Change in 
 
Prediction 
 
Finding 
H9a R&D Investment Change Insignificant 
H9b Capital Investment Increase Insignificant 
H9c Dividend Payment Increase Insignificant 
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